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INTRODUCTION
An important debate is raging regarding the federal regulato-
ry role in the securities markets. On one side of this debate are
those arguing that private securities litigation is dominated by
greedy attorneys who use protracted litigation to extort large
settlements from legitimate business, imposing a pernicious "liti-
gation tax" upon the cost of capital in America and flooding our
courts;1 on the other side are those arguing that private litiga-
* Steven A. Ramirez is an Associate Professor of Law at Washburn University
School of Law, and a former enforcement attorney with the Securities and Exchange
Commission. He also serves occasionally as an arbitrator for the National Association
of Securities Dealers. This Article was presented to the Washburn University School
of Law Faculty, through a faculty development seminar organized by Professor Wil-
liam Rich. Many helpful comments from that presentation served to improve this pa-
per. Bobby J. Hiebert and Thomas Bayles provided excellent research assistance.
1. See, e.g., REPRESENTATIVE NEWT GINGRIcH ET AL., CONTRACT WITH AMERICA
150 (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994) ("Since class-action lawyers can make
decisions that are not in the best interest of the clients . . .shareholders are often
exploited. Strike suits are money-makers for the lawyers but such frivolous claims
destroy jobs and hurt the economy."); Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter?
A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. RFV. 497, 500
(1991) (arguing that lawsuits are filed very frequently against companies whose stock
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tion is the only realistic means of enforcing federal regulation,
that the American financial markets are widely perceived to be
the fairest and most efficient in the world, and that there is lit-
tle, if any, evidence that the system has been abused.2 The
stakes in this debate are huge.3 American fortunes ride upon the
success of our financial markets as never before because of in-
creased international economic competition and important de-
mographic trends.4 Unfair financial markets are a breeding
declines significantly, that most cases settle, and that settlements are not based
upon merits but rather upon legal costs and other nonmerit factors); Curt Cutting,
Turning Point for Rule 10b-5: Will Congressional Reforms Protect Small Corporations,
56 OHIO ST. L.J. 555, 583 (1995) (concluding that frivolous lawsuits amount to a
"tax on innovation," particularly for small corporations); Ralph K. Winter, Paying
Lawyers, Empowering Prosecutors, and Protecting Managers: Raising the Cost of
Capital in America, 42 DUKE L.J. 945, 976 (1993) (concluding that derivative and
class actions benefit only lawyers and raise the cost of capital in America).
2. See, e.g., D. Brian Hufford, Deterring Fraud vs. Avoiding the 'Strike Suit":
Reaching an Appropriate Balance, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 593, 635-36 (1995) (arguing
that because American capital markets are "the largest and most vibrant in the
world'" any reform measures should be based on proven needs (quoting S. REP. No.
104-98, at 37 (1995))); Joel Seligman, The Merits Do Matter: A Comment on Profes-
sor Grundfest's "Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities
Laws: The Commission's Authority," 108 HARV. L. REV. 438, 457 (1994) ("What has
been most lacking in the legislative debate to date has been authentic data that
provides empirical or theoretical support for particularized law revision. If there is a
case for significant changes in federal securities class action law, it simply has not
been presented to date."); see also GARY W. SHORTER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE, SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM: HAVE FRIVOLOUS SHAREHOLDER SUITS EX-
PLODED?, CRS-34 (May 16, 1995) ("On balance the evidence does not appear to be
compelling enough for one to conclude that warrantless class action suits have ex-
ploded."); John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and Winding Road
to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 BUS. LAW. 335, 339-40
(1996) ("At Senate hearings . . .much of the testimony focused on the perception of
a securities litigation crisis. Many of the witnesses gave anecdotal evidence of wide-
spread abuses in the private litigation system, but the empirical evidence was incon-
clusive." (footnotes omitted)).
3. Senator Arlen Specter pointed out, for example, in debates on the Senate floor
relating to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"), Pub. L.
No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), that:
"The gross national product of the United States . . . amounts to $7 trillion . .. the
sale of stock, approximate[s] $4 trillion." 141 CONG. REC. S19046 (daily ed. Dec. 21,
1995) (statement of Sen. Specter).
4. For example, from 1965 to 1997, the frequency of stock ownership rose from
10.4% of Americans to 43% of Americans. These investors frequently rely on such
investments for their retirement savings. See PETER D. HART RESEARCH ASSOCIATES,
A NATIONAL SURVEY AMONG STOCK INVESTORS, CONDUCTED FOR THE NASDAQ
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ground for panic.5 Inefficient markets, like those that impose
arbitrary costs upon capital, stunt economic growth.6 Most im-
portantly, the public must have confidence in the integrity of our
financial markets in order to insure a stable and inexpensive
source of capital for American business growth.7
STOCK MARKET (1997).
5. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1994) (stating that trading in securities is "affected
with a national public interest" demanding the maintenance of "fair and honest mar-
kets" because unfair markets can lead to "national emergencies" resulting in "wide-
spread unemployment" and "dislocation of trade").
6. Congress has long recognized that the securities markets of the United States
must be both fair and efficient:
The securities markets of the United States are indispensable to the
growth and health of this country's and the world's economy. In order to
raise the enormous sums of investment capital that will be needed in the
years ahead and to assure that that capital is properly allocated among
competing uses, these markets must continue to operate fairly and effi-
ciently. In the Committee's view, the increasing tempo and-magnitude of
the changes that are occurring in our domestic and international economy
make it clear that the securities markets are due to be tested as never
before. Unless these markets adapt and respond to the demands placed
upon them, there is a danger that America will lose ground as an inter-
national financial center and that the economic, financial and commercial
interests of the Nation will suffer.
S. REP. No. 94-75, at 3 (1975).
7. See I LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 217-18 (3d ed.
1998) ("[Increasing investor confidence ... may have important economic conse-
quences. By reducing the perceived risk of corporate securities, compulsory disclosure
would tend to reduce the risk premia that issuers . . . would have to pay, thus in-
creasing the funds available for economic growth."). The supporters of PSLRA would
not dispute this. In fact, according to the Statement of Managers in the Conference
Report accompanying the PSLRA, "Congress has been prompted by significant evi-
dence of abuse in private securities lawsuits to enact reforms to protect investors
and maintain confidence in our capital markets." H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31
(1995).
The purported congressional concern that investor confidence was suffering from
abusive securities litigation seems to be somewhat overstated. As part of the PSLRA,
Congress directed the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to study the need
for further protections of senior citizens and retirement plans from securities fraud
and abusive securities litigation. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act §§ 106,
109. When the SEC conducted this study, it solicited comments from the public and
received over 600 comment letters, many of which raised concerns about protection
from fraud; comments raising concerns about abusive litigation were given very short
shrift. See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Summary of Comments and
Discussion Regarding Protections for Senior Citizens and Qualified Retirement Plans
(visited July 8, 1996) <http'//www.sec.govJnews/studies/study.txt>.
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Recently, those arguing in favor of restricting private enforce-
ment of the federal securities laws have scored near-fatal re-
strictions in the scope of private remedies available under the
federal securities laws. In late 1995, Congress enacted the Pri-
vate Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA),8 which
restricted private claims generally and class actions in particu-
lar.9 Congress enacted this legislation for the purpose of restrict-
ing "strike suits."'10 Congress viewed these suits as a threat to
the ability of financial markets to finance start-up companies
and generate jobs." One notable effect of these "reforms" is that
8. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
9. The degree to which the PSLRA restricts private claims appears to be worse
than intended. Initially, some experts contended that the degree to which private
claims were narrowed was somewhat uncertain. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future
of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Or, Why the Fat Lady Has Not Yet
Sung, 51 BUS. LAW. 975 (1996). Other experts had predicted that the Act would "ef-
fectively . . . destroy the private enforcement capacities that have been given to in-
vestors to police our nation's marketplace." 141 CONG. REC. S19040 (daily ed. Dec.
21, 1995) (letter from Professor Arthur R. Miller of Harvard Law School); see also
141 CONG. REC. S19041 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (letter from Dean John Sexton of
New York University School of Law). As discussed in this Article, courts have thus
far interpreted the PSLRA in a fashion that may well be the death knell of private
claims under the federal securities laws.
"Although the original focus of the litigation reform debate was a concern in
Congress that there had been an explosion of meritless securities lawsuits, particu-
larly class actions, filed solely for their settlement value, the final bill to emerge
from Congress extends far beyond frivolous litigation." Avery, supra note 2, at 336
(footnote omitted). The vast overbreadth of the PSLRA belies any stated intention
that one of its goals was investor protection. After all, the federal securities laws
reach even privately negotiated sales of the entire stock of small businesses. See
Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 697 (1985) (rejecting sale of a busi-
ness exemption from definition of a security). Congress, however, made no attempt
to limit its "reforms" only to the cases that supposedly involve abuses-class action
"strike suits." There was no evidence of abuses in other scenarios.
10. The PSLRA was designed "to protect investors, issuers, and all who are associ-
ated with our capital markets from abusive securities litigation." H.R. REP. No. 104-
369, at 32 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 731. Congress believed that
strike suits, filed in order to extract quick settlements from defendants hoping to
avoid the costs of defending such suits, were causing serious damage to the econo-
my. See id. at 31, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730.
11. "[Tlhe investing public and the entire U.S. economy have been injured by the
unwillingness of the best qualified persons to serve on boards of directors and of
issuers to discuss publicly their future prospects, because of fear of baseless and ex-
tortionate securities lawsuits." Id. at 31-32, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 731.
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securities litigation has shifted to state courts. 2 Consequently,
Congress has recently preempted state law claims when raised
in class action suits involving publicly-held companies.'3 Perhaps
Much of the PSLRA's policy foundation is based on the idea that the merits in
securities litigation do not matter because companies are forced to settle or face
large costs of defense. This argument seems at odds with reality, however, because
many of these complex cases settle on the "eve . . . of trial." In re Oracle Sec.
Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 689 (N.D. Cal. 1990). With a merit-based adjudication so close
at hand, and with most discovery costs sunk, it makes little sense to settle at such
a point except based primarily upon merits. See Steven P. Marino & Ren~e D. Mari-
no, An Empirical Study of Recent Securities Class Action Settlements Involving Ac-
countants, Attorneys, or Underwriters, 22 SEC. REG. L.J. 115, 142 (1994) (concluding
that settlements in securities class actions are merit driven); Sherrie R. Savett, The
Merits Matter Most and Observations on a Changing Landscape Under the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 525, 525 (1997) ("As a
practitioner of more than twenty years in the field representing investors and inves-
tor classes, the merits matter enormously."); Leonard B. Simon & William S. Dato,
Legislating on a False Foundation: The Erroneous Academic Underpinnings of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 959, 961
n.13 (1996) (quoting Professor John C. Coffee, Jr. (in testimony before Congress) that
the conclusion that merits do not matter is a "myth").
12. See Hope Viner Samborn, Fear of Filing, A.B.A. J., May 1997, at 28 (reporting
on a study by Joseph A. Grundfest and Michael A. Perino that showed the PSLRA
left overall litigation rates little changed in 1996, but that about 26% of litigation
activity had moved from federal to state court); see also U.S. SECURITIES AND EX-
CHANGE COMMISSION, OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
AND THE CONGRESS ON THE FIRST YEAR OF PRACTICE UNDER THE PRIVATE SECURI-
TIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995 (1997), reprinted in PRACTICING LAW INSTI-
TUTE, SAILING IN "SAFE HARBORS": DRAFTING FORWARD LOOKING DISCLOSURES 61, 72
(1997) [hereinafter SEC REPORT]. The Report claimed:
The number of securities class actions filed in state court has reportedly
increased. Moreover, many of the state cases are filed parallel to a feder-
al court case in an apparent attempt to avoid some of the procedures im-
posed by the Reform Act, particularly the stay of discovery pending a
motion to dismiss. This may be the most significant development in secu-
rities litigation post-Reform Act. While the allegations contained in state
court complaints are generally similar to those of the federal complaints,
state complaints having no parallel federal action are more likely to be
based solely on forecasts which have not materialized and less likely to
include insider trading allegations.
Id.
13. See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353
(1998); see also Rachel Witmer, Levitt Eshews 'Broad-Based Preemption' of Private
Securities Actions Under State Law, 66 U.S.L.W. 2269, 2270 (Nov. 4, 1997) ("There
are three bills (HR 1653, HR 1689, S 1260) pending in Congress that would . . .
extend PSLRA's standards by requiring certain state court actions to be brought in
federal court, thus preempting such state actions.").
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the most critical effect of the PSLRA, however, is that it leaves
private enforcement of the federal securities laws in near termi-
nal condition.'4 This Article proposes an approach to resolving
the tension between weeding out frivolous securities claims and
permitting meritorious claims to proceed that neither side in
this debate is likely to embrace. 5 Specifically, this Article pro-
poses that private securities claims relating to public companies
be arbitrated to the maximum extent possible.'6 Arbitration has
a long and successful history in the securities broker-dealer in-
dustry, in which it is the dominant form of dispute resolution.'
Federal law exists in this area because nearly seven decades ago Congress
sought to use federal power to enhance the rights of investors in the nation's finan-
cial markets through the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. One of Congress's primary objectives in enacting the federal
securities laws was to "rectify perceived deficiencies in the available common-law
protections." Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983). The pow-
er of the states over securities-related claims, and remedies available to investors
under state law, has been preserved since the very incipiency of federal securities
regulation. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1994)).
14. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S19040 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (letter from Profes-
sor Arthur R. Miller of Harvard Law School).
15. Some commentators have recognized, however, that a balanced proposal is pre-
cisely what is needed in this vital area. "[T]he appropriate policy response is to
search for strategies that can filter out weaker claims earlier in the process while
allowing more meritorious claims to proceed." Joseph A. Grundfest, Why Disimply?,
108 HARv. L. REv. 727, 728 (1995).
16. As used in this Article, arbitration entails the use of small panels of industry
experts, both lawyers and lay persons, to resolve complex securities disputes quickly
and informally by making binding decisions or adjudications. See generally PHILIP J.
HOBLIN, JR., SECURITIES ARBITRATION: PROCEDURES, STRATEGIES, CASES 2-2 to 2-5
(2d ed. 1992) (defining arbitration and giving a broad overview of advantages and
disadvantages, including discussion of "compulsory" arbitration, which requires a
party to "agree" to arbitration).
17. See C. EDWARD FLETCHER, ARBITRATING SECURITIES DISPUTES xviii (1990) ("[llt
is undeniable that, guided by the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration
(SICA) and goaded from time to time by the SEC, arbitration [is] . . . a relatively
low-cost, usually expeditious, and generally fair means of resolving customer . . . dis-
putes with broker-dealer firms."); Deborah Masucci, Securities Arbitration-A Success
Story: What Does the Future Hold?, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 183, 183 (1996) ("De-
spite media criticism of the [arbitration] process, specifically allegations of a pro-in-
dustry bias at forums sponsored by self-regulatory organizations (SROs), the process
and its performance have been largely successful."). This is not to say that securities
arbitration is never controversial. See generally Constantine N. Katsoris, The Betray-
al of McMahon, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 221 (1997) [hereinafter Katsoris, McMahon]
(demonstrating controversy surrounding the issue of punitive damages in arbitration).
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Arbitration is capable of achieving rapid adjudications that
undermine the possibility of extortionate settlements. 8 Arbitra-
tion can" reduce defense costs' 9 and permit meritorious claims to
be resolved quickly by expert panels 20 at little or no net cost to
A 1988 SEC study of 65 brokerage firms found that 39% of all cash securities
account agreements provided for arbitration of disputes, 94% of margin account
agreements had arbitration provisions, and 95% of options accounts had arbitration
agreements. In addition, every broker-dealer must arbitrate disputes upon the de-
mand of customers pursuant to the rules of the SROs, in which membership is man-
datory for all broker-dealers. See Constantine N. Katsoris, SICA: The First Twenty
Years, 23 FORDHAMi URB. L.J. 483, 486 nn.8-9 (1996) [hereinafter Katsoris, SICA].
18. Conventional litigation allows delay to be transformed into settlement leverage.
See Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV.
1, 9 (1984). Miller writes:
In many ways, contemporary federal litigation is analogous to the dance
marathon contests of yesteryear. The object of the exercise is to select a
partner from across the "v," get out on the dance floor, hang on to one's
client, and then drift aimlessly and endlessly to the litigation music for
as long as possible, hoping that everyone else will collapse from exhaus-
tion.
Id. Arbitration can avoid such delays. For example, the NASD, which handles the
vast majority of securities arbitrations and handled 85% of all new customer com-
plaints in 1994, has achieved a remarkable track record for resolving often complex
broker-customer disputes. See Masucci, supra note 17, at 188 ("During 1994, the
NASD closed 4,561 cases. The average length of time it took a case to close in 1994
was 10.4 months with the average hearing lasting 2.5 days." (footnote omitted)). It is
difficult to argue with Ms. Masucci's assertion that "these are remarkable figures
when compared to the time for resolution in crowded court dockets nationwide." Id.
at 188-89. Compare THOMAS E. WILLGiNG, ET AL., EMPIRIcAL STUDY OF CLASs Ac-
TIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMIT-
TEE ON CIVIL RULES 117 (1996) (finding that the median time from filing to ultimate
disposition for a sample of 103 federal class action securities fraud cases was 21.7
months), with Marino & Marino, supra note 11, at 127 (sampling 229 federal secu-
rities class actions and finding average time period of 3.9 years to settlement).
19. As one scholar noted:
Arbitration is . . . considerably cheaper than litigation-about one-third
the cost, even taking into consideration that both parties may be repre-
sented by counsel .... The parties are not the only beneficiaries of [arbi-
tration]. Arbitration promotes important societal interests as well. Be-
cause of the crowded court dockets, for every claim that is litigated, an-
other is left waiting. Thus, to the extent more cases go to arbitration,
more claimants who may not have agreed to arbitrate their claims will
have access to the federal courts. In addition, the unnecessary litigation
of cases in federal court carries with it enormous dollar costs for society
as a whole.
C. Edward Fletcher, III, Privatizing Securities Disputes Through the Enforcement of
Arbitration Agreements, 71 MINN. L. REV. 393, 458 (1987) (footnote omitted).
20. See Anthony DeToro, Waiver of the Right to Compel Arbitration of Investor-
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taxpayers.2 ' Most importantly, industry-sponsored arbitration in
the securities broker-dealer industry under Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) supervision provides investors with a
fair process for the resolution of securities claims.22 In short,
arbitration can enhance the quality of justice available in this
vital area as well as protect incipient capital formation from the
costs of "strike suits." This Article recognizes that proposing an
arbitration regime to resolve these claims raises a host of issues
and it attempts to address the most important of these problems
as well as to open a dialogue on alternative methods of resolving
securities claims. This Article thus endeavors to begin a process.
Indeed, one thesis of this Article is that lawmakers should pro-
ceed cautiously in addressing the proposal advanced here and
implement any arbitration process in a gradual fashion in order
to avoid unintended consequences. For example, the creation of
a system of arbitration that becomes mired in litigation regard-
ing its legitimacy would be counterproductive.
The Article concludes that Congress or the SEC should begin
to implement an arbitration program that ultimately would re-
quire agreements to arbitrate all securities disputes involving
publicly-traded companies before a SEC-sponsored forum. Under
the authority and supervision of the SEC, arbitration of these
disputes can be regulated and monitored to preserve substantive
Broker Disputes, 21 CUMB. L. REV. 615, 618-19 (1991) (noting benefits of arbitrator
expertise).
21. Indeed, SROs work hard to assure that the procedures for the arbitration of
broker-customer disputes are constantly refined, updated, and monitored. For exam-
ple, former SEC Chairman David S. Ruder chaired an Arbitration Policy Task Force,
appointed in 1994, that thoroughly assessed the need for improvements in the arbi-
tration process. See ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE, REPORT ON SECURITIES ARBI-
TRATION REFORM 1-3 (1996). Although the so-called "Ruder Report" has not been
without controversy, it generally is acknowledged to have been "quite constructive."
See Katsoris, McMahon, supra note 17, at 225. The NASD recovers approximately
70% of its direct expenses of operating an arbitration forum from expenses paid by
parties. The other 30% is covered through general assessments paid by its members.
See ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE, supra, at 141.
22. See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 17, at 98-104 (reviewing all available data re-
garding the fairness of arbitration procedures in the securities context and conclud-
ing that there is no evidence of a pro-industry bias); see also Letter from Richard G.
Ketchum, Director of Division of Market Regulation, SEC, to SICA Members (Sept.
10, 1987), reprinted in HOBLIN, supra note 16, at XVI-2 (concluding, after an 18
month examination, that "securities industry arbitration generally operates fairly").
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fairness while securing the benefits of arbitration, especially
lower costs, speedier resolutions, and the elimination of frivolous
claims.23 This Article does not propose to modify the substantive
law applicable to such disputes or to preempt any relevant state
law. Rather, this Article posits that simply changing the way
such disputes are resolved may enhance the quality of justice
achieved, as well as eliminate abuses stemming from the pursuit
of frivolous claims. Although no state law would be preempted,
this Article does propose that an investor's ability to pursue
state law remedies in state court be restricted pursuant to arbi-
tration agreements. In other words, this Article proposes a more
limited, less formal preemption than the proposal recently
adopted by Congress. Investors could pursue all substantive
claims, both state and federal, but only in arbitration.
Part I of this Article traces the evolution of private en-
forcement of the federal securities laws, including recent devel-
opments restricting private enforcement. Part I of the Article
concludes that policymakers recently have given inadequate
weight to the overall success of federal regulation of the securi-
ties markets and the role of private enforcement in that success.
As a result, recent initiatives to restrict private enforcement ex-
pose our securities markets to unjustified risks of deregulation.
On the other hand, the Article notes that frivolous lawsuits
present other risks to the securities markets and should be de-
terred in a balanced manner.
Part II of this Article demonstrates that arbitration of securi-
ties-related claims against publicly-traded companies can be
used to help extinguish frivolous suits while permitting private
enforcement to function properly to remedy investor injuries and
deter misconduct. First, the arbitration of securities claims in
23. The SEC has a long history of supervising the arbitration of securities claims
in broker-customer disputes. For example, in 1983, the SEC enacted a regulation
prohibiting the use of predispute arbitration agreements. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2
(1984). In 1987, the SEC began to support such agreements and rescinded this rule.
See Rescission of Rule Governing Use of Predispute Arbitration Clauses in Broker-
Dealer Customer Agreements, Exchange Act Release No. 25034, [1987 Transfer Bind-
er] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) I 84,163, at 88,886 (Oct. 15, 1987). These releases are
exemplary of the SEC's plenary power over SRO arbitration rules.
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the context of broker-customer disputes provides a sound basis
for concluding that arbitration can be an effective means of re-
solving disputes in this vital area. Second, there is now a wealth
of knowledge regarding the efficacy of Alternative Dispute Reso-
lution (ADR) that suggests that arbitration of these types of
claims is a prudent policy course. Third, this mode of resolution
is inimical to frivolous suits. Finally, both the SEC and Congress
have broad powers to implement this kind of arbitration regime.
The Article concludes that the SEC and Congress should take all
necessary steps to encourage the development of a system of
arbitration of securities-related claims involving publicly-held
companies.
I. THE PSLRA: WRONG REFORM IN THE WRONG INDUSTRY
AT THE WRONG TIME
Any discussion of the proper method of resolving private secu-
rities claims must begin with the historical basis of such litiga-
tion. Private securities litigation under federal securities laws is
only a part of the overall enforcement of the federal regulatory
regime.24 This regulatory regime includes the imposition of regis-
tration requirements designed to achieve full disclosure of mate-
rial facts to the financial markets,25 the regulation of the securi-
ties brokerage industry,26 and the prohibition of fraudulent con-
duct through the broad antifraud provisions of the federal secu-
rities laws.2" Enforcement mechanisms consist of SEC civil en-
forcement proceedings and penalties,21 including administrative
sanctions,29 criminal sanctions, 0 and the extension of private
24. The Supreme Court, however, has consistently recognized that private enforce-
ment is "'a most effective weapon'" in the enforcement of the federal securities laws
and "'a necessary supplement'" to government enforcement. See Bateman Eichler, Hill
Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 310 (1985) (quoting J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,
377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964)).
25. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 77f, 77g (1994) (requiring registration statements
for distributions of securities, which must include disclosure of material facts).
26. See, e.g., id. §§ 78f, 78o (requiring registration of exchanges and broker-dealers).
27. See, e.g., id. §§ 771, 78j.
28. See, e.g., id. §§ 78u, 78u-1.
29. See, e.g., id. § 78u-2.
30. See, e.g., id. § 78ff.
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remedies to injured investors. 1 The broadest private remedy and
antifraud provision is Rule 10b-5, which the SEC promulgated
pursuant to statutory authority under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act").32 Although Congress has tightened
this regulatory regime periodically, Congress had left its basic
structure largely intact until it enacted the PSLRA.3 Before
that, this regulatory scheme had functioned successfully for over
sixty years.
31. See, e.g., id. § 771.
32. Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or
of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,
or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998). Courts have implied a private remedy under Rule 10b-
5 for over 50 years. See, e.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512
(E.D. Pa. 1946).
33. See Simon & Dato, supra note 11, at 960 ("Congress recently passed the most
sweeping revision of the federal securities laws since 1933-34.").
34. See S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 37 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.CAN. 679, 715
(presenting comments by Sens. Sarbanes, Bryan, and Boxer that "[olur securities
markets have been operating under the Federal securities laws since those laws
were enacted 60 years ago . . . [and] our markets today are the largest and most
vibrant in the world . . . not in spite of the Federal securities laws, but in part be-
cause of the Federal securities laws"); U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
Chairman Arthur Levitt, Remarks at 22nd Annual Securities Regulation Institute, in
PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, 1 SWEEPING REFORM: LITIGATING AND BESPEAKING CAU-
TION UNDER THE NEW SECURITIES LAW 300, 304 (1996) ("Our markets are the best
in the world, partly because our securities laws are the best in the world."). In fact,
the adjustments Congress has made to the basic federal regulatory scheme since the
1930s have almost uniformly been to extend the regulatory reach of the federal secu-
rities laws. For example, in the 1960s, the Williams Act expanded the reach of the
federal securities laws to extend to tender offers for controlling blocks of stock. See
Williams Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1994)). In the 1970s, Congress also expanded the
SEC's regulatory power over broker-dealers. See Securities Acts Amendments of
1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
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A. A Short History of Private Securities Litigation
The federal role in securities regulation has its roots in the
ultimate financial catastrophe--The Great Depression.3 5 Shortly
after taking office, as one of the earliest New Deal initiatives,
President Franklin Roosevelt proposed legislation that ultimate-
ly became the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act")Y.3  The
Securities Act required the registration (and accompanying full
disclosure) of initial distributions of securities." The Securities
Act focused only upon initial offerings of securities, therefore
Congress enacted the Exchange Act, which provided for regula-
35. In a time when some speak of a new economic paradigm, in which low infla-
tion and low unemployment may co-exist indefinitely, it is difficult to capture the
trauma of The Great Depression. Unemployment went from 3.2% in 1929 to 25.2%
in 1933 and stayed above 10% until 1941. Real Gross National Product plunged
from $709.6 billion in 1929 to $498.5 billion in 1933. The economy did not return to
1929 levels until 1939. See ROBERT J. GORDON, MACROECONOMICS 190-94 (5th ed.
1989). Similarly, investor confidence was so low before the enactment of the federal
securities laws that the issuance of new corporate securities had plummeted from
$9.4 billion in 1929 to $380 million in 1933. See I LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 7,
at 216. This is the reason lawmakers pursued aggressive policies to restore confi-
dence, including enacting the federal securities laws.
Much debate surrounds the efficacy of the federal securities laws. Compare
George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. BUS. 117, 124
(1964) ("[Situdies suggest that the S.E.C. registration requirements had no important
effect on the quality of new securities sold to the public.") with Irwin Friend & Ed-
ward S. Herman, The S.E.C. Through a Glass Darkly, 37 J. BUS. 382, 389 (1964)
("We doubt that any person reasonably well acquainted with the evolution of stock-
market practices between the pre- and post-SEC periods could lament or underrate
the success of the new legislation in eradicating many of [the] weaknesses in our
capital markets."). This Article does not attempt to resolve this debate, but confi-
dence is dependent upon human perception and investors do not wander about with
confidence indicators blinking on their foreheads. This is clear: the period of 1935
(the first full year after the enactment of the Exchange Act) to the present has been
marked by steady economic growth. See GORDON, supra, at A1-A3 and 585-88; see
also Friend & Herman, supra, at 386 ("Stigler of course is aware . . . that since the
advent of the S.E.C. the stockmarket has had no debacle corresponding to that in
the early 1930's."). Given this fact, this Article posits that caution is warranted until
reliable empirical evidence demonstrates a need for change and there is some indica-
tion of the efficacy of specific proposals.
Today, issuance of new securities is soaring, especially for issuers accessing the
public markets for the first time. See Seligman, supra note 2, at 440 (reporting that
initial public offerings went from $43.6 billion in 1991, to $66.5 billion in 1992, to
$112 billion in 1993).
36. See H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 1-2 (1933).
37. See Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a to 77z-3 (1994)).
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tion of the securities industry and required periodic disclosure
for publicly-held companies. 8 Roosevelt made clear that these
acts were designed to heighten fiduciary obligations in securities
transactions in order to restore public confidence in the nation's
financial markets. 9 Congress joined the President in emphasiz-
ing the importance of investor confidence within a modern eco-
nomic system.40
The courts initially embraced the remedial nature of the fed-
eral securities laws and broadly interpreted their provisions to
achieve those ends.4' Further, the courts, as well as the SEC,
recognized the crucial role of private securities enforcement pro-
ceedings as an essential supplement to the SEC's limited en-
forcement resources.42 Indeed, in 1946, the federal courts began
to imply private rights of action under the federal securities
laws.43 Since then, the Supreme Court has determined the exis-
38. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to 78mm (1994)).
39. "This proposal adds to the ancient rule caveat emptor, the further doctrine 'let
the seller also beware.' It puts the burden of telling the whole truth on the seller. It
should give impetus to honest dealing in securities and thereby bring back public
confidence." H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 2 (quoting letter from President Franklin Roose-
velt).
40. The House Report accompanying the Exchange Act stated:
Unless constant extension of the legal conception of a fiduciary relation-
ship-a guarantee of "straight shooting"-supports the constant extension
of mutual confidence which is the foundation of a maturing and compli-
cated economic system, easy liquidity of the resources in which wealth is
invested is a danger rather than a prop to the stability of that system.
When everything everyone owns can be sold at once, there must be confi-
dence not to sell. Just in proportion as it becomes more liquid and com-
plicated, an economic system must become more moderate, more honest,
and more justifiably self-trusting.
H.R. REP. No. 73-1383, at 5 (1934).
41. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151
(1972) (noting that the intent of the Exchange Act was to "'achieve a high standard
of business ethics in the securities industry' and must "be construed . . .'fiexibly to
effectuate its remedial purposes'" (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
375 U.S. 180, 186, 195 (1963))); Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341,
366 (1963) ("It requires but little appreciation of... what happened in ... the
1920's and "1930's to realize how essential it is that the highest ethical standards
prevail as to every aspect of the [securities business].").
42. See, e.g., Berner v. Lazzaro, 730 F.2d 1319, 1322 (9th Cir. 1984) ("[The re-
sources of the [SEC] are adequate to prosecute only the most flagrant abuses."); see
also Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 310 (1985) (stat-
ing that private actions are indispensable for the enforcement of securities laws).
43. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
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tence of a private action under Rule 10b-5 to be "beyond perad-
venture,"" and has proceeded to define this implied private right
of action in a series of opinions." The Court, with the support of
the SEC,46 allowed the private remedy under Rule 10b-5 to
thrive, and no Justice has ever seriously questioned the propri-
ety of recognizing such a remedy.4'
After many decades of remarkable success,48 and with fading
memories of the cataclysm of the Great Depression, the judicial
The SEC filed a brief in Kardon demonstrating its intent that Rule 10b-5 give rise
to a private right of action. See Grundfest, supra note 15, at 990 n.130. The SEC
filed this brief only four years after it had promulgated Rule 10b-5. See id.
44. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983). See generally
THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 13.1 (3d ed. 1996) (dis-
cussing evolution of private action under Rule 10b-5).
45. See, e.g., Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S.
350, 358-61 (1991) (defining statute of limitations for Rule 10b-5 action); Herman &
MacLean, 459 U.S. at 387-90 (defining standard of proof for Rule 10b-5 action);
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193-214 (1976) (defining state of mind
required for a Rule 10b-5 violation).
46. The SEC has consistently asserted that the private remedy under Rule 10b-5
is a "necessary supplement" to the SEC's enforcement powers and a "most effective"
enforcement tool. See Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus
Curiae at 1, Gilbertson (No. 90-333); Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion as Amicus Curiae at 6, Herman & MacLean (Nos. 81-680 and 81-1076); Brief
for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae at 10 n.2, Ernst &
Ernst (No. 74-1042).
47. The growth of the private remedy under Rule 10b-5 has been called a 'judicial
oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn." Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
48. The general satisfaction with the regulatory approach of the federal securities
laws has been stated best, over the decades, by Congress itself. For example, in
1964 Congress (through the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce)
stated:
The Securities Act of 1933, relating to truthful disclosure of information
about new security offerings; the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, relat-
ing to disclosure of information about listed securities and regulating
practices in exchange and over-the-counter operations; and succeeding
legislation which is administered by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission; represent legislation of which this committee and the Congress
are justly proud. These statutes have gone a long way in the mitigation
and elimination of undesirable practices in the securities field, in the res-
toration of confidence in securities markets, and in the protection of the
investing public.
H.R. REP. No. 88-1418, at 4 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.AN. 3013, 3016.
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view of private securities litigation "evolved" from a "necessary
enforcement supplement" to a positively vexatious tool.49 In an
era of pervasive demonization of attorneys, the private securities
lawyer became the caricature of the greedy, self-serving destroy-
er of upstanding captains of industry." Courts began to take a
more restrictive approach to private securities claims.51
By the 1990s, the Supreme Court in particular seemed deter-
mined to reign in private securities claims. In Lampf, Pleva,
Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson,52 the Court dramati-
cally shortened the statute of limitations applicable to private
claims under Rule 10b-5."3 In Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v.
Congress has emphasized investor protection and investor confidence as an im-
portant, even compelling, policy objective because "[ilt is a basic teaching of this na-
tion's financial history that continued economic health fundamentally depends upon
the maintenance of investor confidence." H.R. REP. No. 94-123, at 43-44 (1975); see
also S. REP. No. 91-1218, at 2 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5254, 5256;
H.R. REP. No. 88-1418, at 6-7 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3013, 3019-20
(demonstrating congressional determination to maintain investor confidence).
In fact, each of the above legislative reports relates to legislation specifically de-
signed to enhance the investor protection elements of the federal securities laws. See
Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (expanding SEC oversight of self-regula-
tory organizations that supervise broker-dealers); Securities Investor Protection Act of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-598, 84 Stat. 1636 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-
78111 (1994)) (extending insurance to balances held by securities broker-dealers); Se-
curities Acts Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (extending the regulatory power of the
federal securities laws and the SEC to over-the-counter markets).
49. See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 739 ("[L]itigation under Rule 10b-5 pres-
ents a danger of vexatiousness different in degree and in kind from that which ac-
companies litigation in general.").
50. One particularly graphic critic of securities lawyers was former Senator
Alfonse D'Amato of New York, who stated that plaintiffs' securities lawyers were
"sharks, sharks for hire" and "bandits." 141 CONG. REc. S17935-36 (daily ed. Dec. 5,
1995) (statement of Sen. D'Amato).
51. See Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479-80 (1977) (holding
that mere breaches of fiduciary duties are not actionable under Rule 10b-5); Ernst &
Ernst, 425 U.S. at 206 (holding that scienter must be proven as part of Rule 10b-5
claim); Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 731-55 (holding that only securities purchas-
ers or sellers have standing under Rule 10b-5).
52. 501 U.S. 350 (1991).
53. See id. at 360-62 (holding that the limitations period for 10b-5 claims is one
year from discovery, but in no event more than three years from the date of the
transaction).
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First Interstate Bank of Denver, N-A.,M the Court eliminated
aiding and abetting liability in private actions under Rule 10b-
5.55 In Gustafson v. Alloyd,56 the Court restricted the availability
of rescission claims under the Securities Act by engrafting a re-
quirement that a plaintiff in such an action be a purchaser in a
public offering.57 These are only the most recent judicial re-
trenchments. Some commentators have noted that the Court has
been scaling back investor protections under the federal securi-
ties laws for twenty years.
58
The lower federal courts, taking a cue from the Supreme
Court, have developed broad doctrinal rules that have resulted
in an increasing number of early dismissals or summary
judgments in private securities cases. 59 For example, the federal
courts used Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) as a means of
terminating private securities claims, often in ways that turned
that rule on its head.6" Similarly, the lower courts developed doc-
trines that effectively robbed juries of the ability to determine if
54. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
55. See id. at 191 (holding that aiding and abetting liability was not statutorily
authorized after 25 years of lower courts imposing such liability).
56. 513 U.S. 561 (1995).
57. See id. at 1068 (stating that when Congress enacted § 12(2) of the Securities
Act; it could not have intended to create "vast additional liabilities").
58. See Douglas M. Branson, Running the Gauntlet: A Description of the Arduous,
and Now Often Fatal Journey for Plaintiffs in Federal Securities Law Actions, 65 U.
CIN. L. REv. 3, 6 (1996-97) ("In forty federal securities law decisions, the Court de-
cided thirty-two cases for defendants and, in almost every one, significantly nar-
rowed the reach of federal securities laws.").
59. See Avery, supra note 2, at 341-47 (collecting and discussing lower federal
court opinions that dispose of private securities claims on various grounds before
trial).
60. See Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1130 (2d Cir. 1994)
("[P]laintiff must do more than merely charge that executives aim to prolong the
benefits of the positions they hold."); In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259,
263-64 (2d Cir. 1993) (reasoning that some examples of fraud may go unpunished
because the law cannot eliminate all opportunities for unremedied fraud without cre-
ating opportunities for "undeserved settlement[s]"); DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901
F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that "lain accountant's greatest asset is its
reputation" and it would be "irrational" to trade it merely for auditing fees); see also
Melder v. Morris, 27 F.3d 1097, 1103 (5th Cir. 1994) (dismissing allegations against
underwriter that fraud was motivation to generate fees because all underwriters are
fee seekers).
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the given conduct constituted fraud by granting judicial discre-
tion over the issue, which invariably resulted in claim termi-
nation.6 Securities claims were blamed for much of the flood of
litigation allegedly swamping the federal courts. 2 The tone of
many judicial opinions changed as well, from open sympathy for
the purposes of the federal securities laws to open hostility to-
ward private claims.63 Securities plaintiffs, beginning in the
1980s, began facing the frequent imposition of sanctions.64 Al-
though the Court has continued to interpret the federal securi-
ties laws broadly in areas dominated by public enforcement
61. One such example is the so-called "bespeaks caution" doctrine. This doctrine
"holds that economic projections, estimates of future performance, and similar opti-
mistic statements in a prospectus are not actionable when precise cautionary lan-
guage elsewhere in the document adequately discloses the risks involved." In re
Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1413 (9th Cir. 1994). This doctrine is
difficult to square with the Supreme Court's view that whether a misrepresented
fact is material is a question for the jury. See TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426
U.S. 438, 450 n.12 (1976). Some courts go even further, holding that predictions not
cast in terms of a guarantee are not actionable under the federal securities laws.
See, e.g., Raab v. General Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286, 290 (4th Cir. 1993).
62. See 138 CONG. REC. S12599 (1992) (statement of Sen. Domenici) (commenting
that the litigation explosion has reached "epidemic dimensions" in the securities ar-
ea); see also Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1116 (1st Cir. 1989)
(stating that arbitration of securities disputes would stem the "rampant growth of
the civil docket" in federal court). The whole concept of a "litigation explosion" is
rather controversial. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the Barriers to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L.
REV. 1901, 1909 (1989) (questioning the existence of a litigation explosion and noting
that federal judges have about the same number of cases as in 1960).
63. See, e.g., In re Glenfed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1557 (9th Cir. 1994)
("The driving force behind securities fraud suits filed to extract early settlements
disproportionate to the merits is the expectation that once plaintiffs get past the
pleading stage, they will automatically gain access to virtually unlimited discovery.");
Time Warner Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d at 263 (stating that securities plaintiffs use the liti-
gation process to "extract undeserved settlements" because defendants are faced with
large costs of defense); In re Mobile Telecomm. Tech. Corp. Sec. Litig., 915 F. Supp.
828, 832 (S.D. Miss. 1995) ("[Tlhe Fifth Circuit [has] recognized the important
screening function which this more stringent pleading requirement serves in secu-
rities fraud suits . . . ."); Katz v. Household Int'l, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 1106, 1110
(N.D. Ill. 1995) ("We note that our expressed concern was to be faithful to the
teachings of the Seventh Circuit that we should not tolerate the filing of frivolous
complaints under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.").
64. See, e.g., GEORGENE M. VAIRo, RuLE 11 SANCTIONS: CASE LAW PERSPECTIVES
AND PREvENTIVE MEASURES § 6.06[e] (2d ed. 1992 & Supp. 1995) (stating that Rule
11 is increasingly involved in securities fraud cases).
1072 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1055
action, it recently has expressed little support for private en-
forcement of the federal securities laws.65
In 1995, Congress significantly curtailed the availability of
private securities claims under federal law by enacting the
PSLRA.66 The PSLRA modifies the sanctions available against
private securities claimants in a manner approaching a "loser
pays" regime.67 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, feder-
al courts are granted discretion to impose sanctions against
those pleading claims that are not legally warranted, supported
by evidence, or pursued for a proper purpose.68 Under the special
65. Compare United States v. O(Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 650 (1997) (holding that
misappropriation theory could apply as the basis of criminal liability for insider trad-
ing), with Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 189 (1994) (high-
lighting the "vexatiousness" of private enforcement).
66. Professors Loss and Seligman has provided an excellent summary of the
PSLRA, as well as an analysis of all available empirical data supporting the Act.
See X Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 7, at 4636-69 (concluding that data is not con-
sistent with a finding of abusive class action securities litigation).
67. See 15 U.S.CA §§ 77z-1(c), 78u-4(c) (1997).
68. FED. R. CIrv. P. 11. Even before the PSLRA, plaintiffs in securities and RICO
cases were the targets of sanction motions in 84.3% of cases, and actually sanctioned
45.5% of the time. See Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: Where We Are and Where We
Are Going, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. 475, 485 (1991). Despite Dean Vairo's efforts to ed-
ucate Congress on how actively Rule 11 is used in Securities/RICO cases, the Con-
gressional Research Service (CRS) stubbornly insisted that only "three cases in the
history of 10b-5" had actually resulted in the imposition of sanctions under Rule 11.
See Securities Litigation Reform Proposals S. 240, S. 667, and IR 1058, Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, 104th Cong. 425 (1995) [hereinafter Securities Litigation Reform Proposals]
(containing CRS response to letter from Dean Vairo). The CRS must not have looked
very hard. See Garr v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 22 F.3d 1274, 1280 (3d Cir. 1994) (af-
firming Rule 11 sanctions in 10b-5 action); Samuels v. Wilder, 906 F.2d 272, 276
(7th Cir. 1990) (affirming award of Rule 11 sanctions against 10b-5 plaintiff for mo-
tion to reconsider summary judgment entry against 10b-5 claims); Unioil, Inc. v. E.F.
Hutton & Co., 809 F.2d 548, 558-59 (9th Cir. 1986) (imposing sanctions of $294,000
under Rule 11 in 10b-5 case); In re Itel Sec. Litig., 791 F.2d 672, 676 (9th Cir.
1986) (imposing Rule 11 sanctions in 10b-5 case); Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719
F.2d 5, 9 (2d Cir. 1983) (affirming Rule 11 sanctions in Rule 10b-5 case); Kushner v.
DBG Property Investors, Inc., 793 F. Supp. 1161, 1182 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (sanctioning
fraud plaintiff bringing claims under the Exchange Act); Wielgos v. Commonwealth
Edison Co., 123 F.R.D. 299, 304 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (imposing Rule 11 sanctions of
$150,000 in 10b-5 action). Even if the CRS had carefully done their job, they appar-
ently rigged their results by excluding cases on electronic databases, securities cases
resulting in sanctions but not explicitly mentioning Rule 10b-5, and hundreds of un-
reported decisions. See Admiral Capital Venture, I, Ltd. v. Pelczarski, Nos. 88-2639,
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sanctions provisions now applicable to securities claims, courts
must scrutinize pleadings for compliance with Rule 11 at the
end of a case and must assess sanctions if a violation is found. 9
The PSLRA also creates a presumption that the appropriate
sanction for a complaint that violates Rule 11(c) is an award of
all attorneys' fees and costs incurred by the defendants during
the entire action.70 There is no similar provision for answers
that violate Rule 11(c).
Ironically, Congress amended Rule 11 in 1993 specifically be-
cause it had led to abusive "satellite" litigation.71 Congress unin-
88-15594, 1989 WL 150583 (9th Cir. Dec. 11, 1989) (imposing sanctions on 10b-5
plaintiff); Gold v. Fields, No. 92 Civ. 6680 (KMW), 1993 WL 212672 (S.D.N.Y. June
14, 1993) (imposing sanctions for violation of Rule 9(b) in securities fraud action);
Mirman v. Berk & Michaels, P.C., 91 Civ. 8606 (JFK), 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16707
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 1992) (imposing sanctions for bringing time-barred 10b-5 claim);
Steele v. Polymer Research Corp. of America, No. 85 Civ. 5563 (CSH), 1987 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 5270 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 1987) (imposing sanctions relating to Exchange
Act allegations); see also Fox v. Acadia State Bank, 937 F.2d 1566, 1570 (11th Cir.
1991) (imposing sanctions in § 17(a) claim under the Securities Act); Crookham v.
Crookham, 914 F.2d 1027, 1030 (8th Cir. 1990) (pursuing sanctions for claim under
§17(a)); Aizuss v. Commonwealth Equity Trust, 847 F. Supp. 1482 (E.D. Cal. 1993)
(imposing Rule 11 sanctions for claims brought under the Securities Act). The false
conclusions of the CRS are of great importance.
69. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77z-1(c)(1), (2), 78u-4(c)(1), (2). Congress has passed a law
that has made Rule 11 sanctions more likely in securities litigation. If Dean Vairo is
right and the CRS is wrong, as demonstrated above, see supra note 68, securities
litigation has gone from merely hazardous for plaintiffi to practically fatal. Indeed, it
now appears that only the richest law firms can afford to pursue federal claims. See
Samborn, supra note 12, at 28 (noting that 59% of all post-reform cases were
brought by the firm of Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach). Moreover, Congress
consistently relied upon the CRS findings in debating this legislation, and congressio-
nal reliance on this erroneous finding was further reflected by the statement in the
Conference Report that judges impose Rule 11 sanctions reluctantly. See H.R. REP.
No. 104-369, at 31 (1995).
70. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(c)(3)(A)(i), 78u-4(c)(3)(A)(i).
71. As Arthur Miller has stated:
In the course of deliberations within the Judicial Conference during the
revision of Rule 11, the Federal Judicial Center performed a survey of
Federal judges, which showed that the vast majority of them did not be-
lieve that frivolous lawsuits were a major problem. The survey also dem-
onstrated that Federal judges believed that the most expedient way of
dealing with frivolous lawsuits was not through the imposition of sanc-
tions under Rule 11, but through prompt and decisive judicial action on
motions to dismiss under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) and for summary judg-
ment under Federal Rule 56. A decade of practical experience under Rule
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tentionally dealt a near fatal blow to private securities enforce-
ment with this provision because it miscalculated the frequency
of sanctions in securities litigation.72 Private enforcement is so
perilous now that few lawyers seem to be pursuing federal class
action claims.73
The PSLRA imposes heightened pleading standards in actions
under the Exchange Act's antifraud provisions that are a dra-
matic departure from the notice pleading standards generally
imposed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.74 Under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, allegations as to a defendant's
state of mind may be alleged generally, at least if one takes a
plain meaning approach to the statute. 75 Now, for private claims
under the federal securities laws, a plaintiff must plead facts
"giving rise to a strong inference" of scienter.76 Judicial interpre-
tations of this new pleading requirement have raised the ques-
tion of whether it can be satisfied at all, short of explicit admis-
sions of an intent to defraud. For example, courts have held that
pleading a mere motive and opportunity to commit fraud fails
11 also demonstrated that post-1983 expanded "fee shifting" itself
spawned satellite litigation about sanctions and created unnecessary
adversariness between counsel, which in turn impeded cooperation and
settlement.
Securities Litigation Reform: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Telecomms. and Fi-
nance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. 148 (1994) [herein-
after Securities Litigation Reform: Hearings] (prepared statement of Professor Arthur
R. Miller, Harvard Law School).
72. At the very least, the PSLRA has led to an unhealthy concentration of private
enforcement at a single firm, which, after the PSLRA went into effect, appeared in
59% of all securities class actions. See Samborn, supra note 12, at 28. Congress
should hardly be surprised by this. Before Congress overrode President Clinton's
veto, a leading expert in federal practice and procedure, as well as Rule 11 sanc-
tions stated: "It is inconceivable that any citizen, even one with considerable wealth
and a strong case" would bring private securities claims because of the risks posed
by the PSLRA's fee-shifting provisions. 141 CONG. REC. S19040 (daily ed. Dec. 21,
1995) (letter from Professor Arthur R. Miller, Harvard Law School).
73. See Samborn, supra note 12, at 28. The PSLRA also provides that, in class
actions filed under the Exchange Act, courts may require plaintiffs to post security
for costs or sanctions. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(a)(8).
74. Just how dramatic the PSLRA is on this point is a hotly contested issue in
the federal courts. See Malin v. Ivax Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1353 (S.D. Fla.
1998) (collecting cases).
75. See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
76. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b)(2).
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this heightened pleading standard." Even before the PSLRA,
courts had used Rule 9(b) to terminate claims that seemed im-
probable to them;78 now it seems courts are eager to use the
PSLRA as a basis for even wider terminations.79
This heightened pleading standard endangers important secu-
rities law principles, such as the "group-published" information
doctrine, which had operated to preclude defendants with joint
drafting responsibility for documents from shifting the responsi-
bility to some other drafter.8" Under the PSLRA, a court could
77. In re Baesa Sec. Litig., 969 F. Supp. 238, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that
pleading motive and opportunity to defraud is no longer sufficient to comply with
PSLRA pleading standards). Some courts have gone even further, holding that the
PSLRA requires more than just reckless misrepresentations, and that plaintiffs must
plead "specific facts that 'create a strong inference of knowing misrepresentation on
the part of defendants.'" Norwood Venture Corp. v. Converse Inc., 959 F. Supp. 205,
208 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (quoting In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp.
746, 757 (N.D. Cal. 1997)).
78. See, e.g., DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding
that accountants would not engage in fraud in exchange for audit fees and dismiss-
ing claim under Rule 9(b)).
79. See Silicon Graphics, 970 F. Supp. at 757 (holding that "[miotive, opportunity,
and non-deliberate recklessness may provide some evidence of intentional wrongdo-
ing, but alone are not sufficient to support scienter unless the totality of evidence
creates a strong inference of fraud"); see also Havenick v. Network Express, Inc., 981
F. Supp. 480, 524 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (holding that PSLRA requires plaintiff to plead
facts showing a "strong inference" of fraud and that motive and opportunity alone
are insufficient). These courts seem to be interpreting the PSLRA in a manner that
would make securities fraud virtually impossible to plead; "state of mind never
proves itself directly, or it does so only in Perry Mason reruns in which, under with-
ering cross examination, the defendant cries out, 'Yes, I knew (or intended) it all
along.'" Branson, supra note 58, at 16. But see Zeid v. Kimberley, 930 F. Supp. 431,
434 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (following Chantal approach); Marksman Partners, L.P. v.
Chantal Pharm. Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1308 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that either
pleading motive and opportunity to commit fraud, or pleading facts that constitute
circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness, satisfies the PSLRA
pleading standards).
80. The 'group-published" information doctrine provides:
[Wihen the plaintiff is alleging corporate fraud perpetrated on investors
through the use of "group-published information," such as prospectuses,
registration statements, annual reports, and press releases, ... "it is
reasonable to presume that these are collective actions of the officers."
Thus, "[u]nder such circumstances, a plaintiff fulfills the particularity re-
quirement of Rule 9(b) by pleading the misrepresentations with particu-
larity and when possible the roles of the individual defendants in the
misrepresentations."
Maywalt v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 808 F. Supp. 1037, 1047 (S.D.N.Y.
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conceivably hold that a plaintiff must allege facts giving rise to a
strong inference of scienter against each defendant.81 The
PSLRA also denies a plaintiff discovery until this pleading stan-
dard is satisfied.82 Thus, not only must a plaintiff allege facts
"giving rise to a strong inference" of fraud, the plaintiff also is
denied discovery in aid of uncovering such facts.
The PSLRA creates a safe harbor for certain fraudulent mis-
statements in "forward looking statements."" Specifically, the
PSLRA protects specified persons from liability for such state-
ments if the statement is accompanied by "meaningful caution-
ary statements" that identify important factors that could cause
actual results to diverge from projections, even if the statements
are made with a fraudulent intent.8 4 Persons who enjoy this in-
sulation from liability include issuers, underwriters, and review-
ers of information provided by issuers.85 The PSLRA provides
various exemptions from the applicability of the safe harbor and
limits the application of the safe harbor to statements relating
to issuers that are required to register under the Exchange
Act.86
The PSLBA statutorily prescribes causation standards that
may be interpreted to support broad pretrial terminations of
1992) (quoting Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1440 (9th Cir.
1987)).
81. Such a result would be absurd. Surely, group fraud is not exempt from the
scope of the federal securities laws, and there is no basis for denying a plaintiff re-
lief simply because it may be difficult to attribute a group statement to a particular
defendant.
82. See 15 U.S.C.A- §§ 77z-1(b)(2), 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (1997). Prior to the Act, courts
disfavored stays of discovery. See, e.g., In re Lotus Dev. Corp. Sec. Litig., 875 F.
Supp. 48, 51 (D. Mass. 1995) (stating that a party seeking a stay of discovery bears
a "stiff" burden).
83. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77z-2, 78u-5.
84. Id. 99 77z-2(c)(1)(A)(i), 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i) (exempting certain statements from
liability); see also 141 CONG. REC. S19,042 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (letter from
Professor John C. Coffee, Jr. stating that safe-harbor would give issuers a "license to
lie").
85. See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(a) (1994).
86. See id. §§ 77z-2(a), 78u-5(a) (limiting safe harbor to reporting companies under
15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) or 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)). The Exchange Act requires companies
with more than 500 shareholders and $10 million in assets to register with the SEC
and file periodic financial information under section 77n(a). See 15 U.S.C. § 781(g);
17 C.F.R. §240.12g-1 (1998).
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securities actions.8 7 It requires that plaintiffs plead loss causa-
tion in all claims brought under the Exchange Act.8 8 Similarly,
defendants now may avoid rescission liability under section
12(2) of the Securities Act if they can prove an absence of loss
causation.89 Loss causation is a form of proximate cause that re-
quires a plaintiff to allege and prove that, but for the
defendant's wrongdoing, the plaintiff would not have incurred
the damages that form the basis of the suit.9 ° Thus, if a plaintiff
invested because a securities promoter did not disclose his crimi-
nal background, but the plaintiff suffers damages because of a
crash in oil prices, the plaintiff can show only transaction causa-
tion and not loss causation.91
This provision of the PSLRA directly overruled many federal
decisions that required only "but for" causation or "substantial
factor" causation for claims under the federal securities laws.92
For example, under the proxy rules, courts have long held that
materiality satisfied causation requirements for private liti-
gants.93 Loss causation generally is a form of proximate cause
that cuts off claims for injuries that are deemed too remote from
the alleged misconduct.94 As a result of the PSLRA, courts will
87. See Bastian v. Petren Resources Corp., 892 F.2d 680, 686 (7th Cir. 1990) (af-
firming dismissal based upon loss causation).
88. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b)(4).
89. See id. § 771(b).
90. See id.
91. See Bastian, 892 F.2d at 685 (determining that dismissal is appropriate based
on "speculation" that oil ventures run by honest promoters could not have succeeded
and that plaintiffs would have invested in another oil venture if they had known the
promoters were dishonest).
92. See Rowe v. Maremont Corp., 850 F.2d 1226, 1242 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating
that defendant must show loss caused by factors other than Rule 10b-5 violation).
The PSLRA also throws the "fraud on the market" theory into question. See In re
Control Data Corp. Sec. Litig., 933 F.2d 616, 619-20 (8th Cir. 1991) (demonstrating
that under "fraud on the market" theory, plaintiff may rely on the market price of a
publicly traded stock, and if a defendant's misrepresentations artificially affect the
price, "causation is presumed").
93. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 385 (1970) ("Where there has
been a finding of materiality, a shareholder has made a sufficient showing of causal
relationship between the violation and the injury [where] . . . he proves that the
proxy solicitation itself... was an essential link in the accomplishment of the
transaction.").
94. See Bastian, 892 F.2d at 686.
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now dismiss more claims of securities fraud for failure to dem-
onstrate causation.95 State courts generally have been far more
lenient in dealing with causation in the securities area, leaving
the issue to the jury.96
Prior to the PSLRA, securities violators were jointly and sev-
erally liable.97 Under the PSLRA, only defendants who knowing-
ly commit violations of the Exchange Act are jointly and several-
ly liable.9" Other defendants are liable only for the proportion of
damages for which the trier of fact finds them responsible.99
Thus, under the PSLRA, the trier of fact must determine each
defendant's liability. The PSLRA includes certain exceptions to
the operation of the modified system of proportionate liability it
imposes,'00 such as preserving joint and several liability against
those who commit knowing violations of law.' This "reform,"
which essentially shifts the risk of an insolvent or judgment-
proof defendant to the plaintiff, specifically operates only with
respect to meritorious claims.
10 2
The PSLRA also takes aim at private class actions brought
under the federal securities laws.'0 3 Class actions frequently
95. The PSLRA's provisions regarding loss causation have not been a source of
much controversy. This is surprising given that causation has generally been treated
as a question of fact for the jury. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328C
(1965). To use "loss causation" to make fact-intensive inquiries at the motion to dis-
miss stage seems to be a perversion of the proximate cause doctrine.
96. Indeed, even in Illinois, loss causation is not required to recover under the
state blue sky law. See Lucas v. Downtown Greenville Investors, Ltd., 671 N.E.2d
389, 400 (Ill. Ct. App. 1996); see also Davey v. Hedden, 920 P.2d 420 (Kan. 1996)
(stating that the issue of proximate cause is normally a question of fact for jury).
97. See Marc J. Steinberg & Christopher D. Olive, Contribution and Proportionate
Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws in Multidefendant Securities Litigation
After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 50 SMU L. REv. 337, 341
(1996).
98. See 15 U.S.C.-A § 78u-4(g)(2)(A) (1997).
99. See id. § 78u-4(g)(2)(B).
100. See id. § 78u-4(g)(4).
101. See id. § 78u-4(g)(2)(A).
102. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Reform of Joint and Several Liability Under
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Proportionate Liability, Contri-
bution Rights and Settlement Effects, 51 BUS. LAW. 1157, 1174 (1996) (concluding
that because this reform applies to meritorious, non-class action claims, it is
overbroad).
103. See generally 7B WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1806
(2d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1998).
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have been the subject of scholarly analysis and have been criti-
cized for creating divergent interests between class members
and class counsel.' The PSLRA presents a multi-pronged at-
tack upon private securities class actions. First, individuals are
restricted from acting as lead plaintiffs in such actions without
certifying that they meet certain eligibility requirements and
have received no payments for serving as class representa-
tives.105 Congress intended these eligibility requirements to elim-
inate "professional plaintiffs."16 Second, the incentives for initi-
ating class actions are diminished because control over such ac-
tions now generally vests in a lead plaintiff, who is presumed to
be the person with the greatest economic stake in the litiga-
tion.107 Congress intended this provision to encourage institu-
tional investors, or other significant investors, to control class
counsel and to assure that the litigation is pursued for the bene-
fit of the class.10 8 Third, class settlements of securities claims
must be supported by far more extensive disclosures than those
required for other claims.0 9 This provision serves to assure set-
tlements are fair to investors. These provisions have a common
thread: Congress wanted a check on the power of class counsel
to manage the litigation in their own interest." Along these
lines, Congress also required that attorneys' fees awarded pur-
suant to any class settlement not exceed a reasonable percent-
age of the damages awarded the class."'
104. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implica-
tions of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Deriva-
tive Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 671-72 (1986); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey
P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation:
Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1991).
105. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(a)(2), 78u-4(a)(2).
106. See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 32-33 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
730, 732-33.
107. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77z-1(a)(3), 78u-4(a)(3) (requiring publication of notice of
class proceeding to encourage lead plaintiffs to come forward); id. §§ 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(i),
78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i) (specifying the process for appointment of lead plaintiff); id. §§ 77z-
l(a)(3)(B)Cv), 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v) (stating that lead plaintiff retains counsel).
108. See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 34, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.CAN. 730, 733.
109. See 15 U.S.CA. §§ 77z-1(a)(7), 78u-4(a)(7).
110. See Avery, supra note 2, at 374.
111. See 15 U.S.CA §§ 77z-1(a)(6), 78u-4(a)(6).
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The PSLRA has a very controversial history. The Supreme
Court's restrictive approach to the statute of limitations under
Rule 10b-5 triggered the process of legislative reform. At first,
opponents of the restoration of a more realistic statute of limita-
tions resisted, claiming that frivolous claims also must be ad-
dressed."2 After the congressional elections of 1994, efforts to ex-
tend the statute of limitations disappeared and the prevention of
frivolous suits became the primary motivation for reform."
Congress held extensive hearings on the issue of frivolous law-
suits" and eventually passed the PSLRA over President
Clinton's veto."5 President Clinton objected on three grounds:
first, the PSLRA's pleading standards were too stringent; sec-
ond, the sanctions provisions too closely resembled a "loser pays"
system, particularly for plaintiffs; and third, the safe harbor for
forward-looking frauds was too broad."6
B. An Assessment of the PSLRA
One effect of the PSLRA is that many plaintiffs have pursued
securities claims in state court."7 Thus, the "reforms" wrought
by the Court and Congress have resulted in the de facto de-fed-
eralization of private securities claims."8 Another result is sure
to be weaker enforcement of the federal securities laws and,
therefore, less incentive for compliance. Despite its likely effects,
the PSLRA was passed with little debate of the risks of return-
ing to a pre-Depression regime of investors being relegated to
112. See Avery, supra note 2, at 338 n.12.
113. See id.
114. See, e.g., Securities Litigation Reform Proposals, supra note 68; Securities Liti-
gation Reform: Hearings, supra note 71.
115. See 141 CONG. REC. H15,214 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995) (veto message of Presi-
dent Clinton).
116. See id.
117. See Samborn, supra note 12, at 28.
118. See Branson, supra note 58, at 40-41 ("[Tlhey-conservative federal judges, lob-
byists for corporate American and other defense interests, and Congress-have joined
together to destroy completely the federal courts as places of refuge and protection
for defrauded investors.").
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state law remedies,1 19 or the dangers of deregulation in the fi-
nancial services industry2m0
With federal regulation emasculated, discussion of the pros-
pects for a "race to the bottom" among the states in securities
regulation takes on a new importance. 121 Every state would want
to encourage business development within its borders, especially
if the costs of doing so can be shifted to out-of-state investors.122
In fact, Arizona already has passed legislation modeled on the
PSLRA.
12
One also must question whether Congress really is prepared
to increase the resources allocated to the SEC or to rely on the
states to increase regulation to compensate for decreased private
enforcement." Indeed, Congress recently preempted state law
119. See H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 2 (1933) (stating that between 1920 and 1930
about one-half of the $50 billion of new securities issued were worthless). Moreover,
if leaving investors to state remedies has proven such a failure, it is doubtful that
using federal law to restrict state remedies is likely to fare better. See Levitt, supra
note 34, at 2 ("In my judgment, draconian denials of the right of private action rep-
resent as tangible [a] danger to our markets as" the dangers underlying the
PSLRA).
120. Perhaps the most notorious example of precipitous deregulation in the finan-
cial services industry is the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s. See Michael
Waldman, The S&L Collapse: The Cost of a Congress for Sale, STAN. L. & POLY
REV., Spring 1990, at 47, 48 (discussing the impact of "reckless deregulation"). The
total cost of the massive federal bailout of this industry exceeds $1 trillion. See
Steven A. Ramirez, The Chaos of 12 U.S.C. Section 1821(k): Congressional Subsidiz-
ing of Negligent Bank Directors and Officers?, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 625, 629 (1996)
(quantifying the losses from bank crisis of the 1980s).
121. Cf William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Dela-
ware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 666 (1974) (arguing that Delaware has led a "race to the
bottom" by adopting corporation law provisions designed to attract managers to Dela-
ware as a place of incorporation). Certainly, underwriters, high tech firms, brokers,
accountants, and lawyers may hold sway over state legislatures, especially if express
or implied threats are made to move the center of their operations elsewhere, where
they may be able to avail themselves of friendlier laws.
122. See id. at 698 (discussing the problem of locally generated revenues creating
nationwide problems and costs). Broker-dealers or other businesses often will be able
to specify contractually that the law of their domicile will govern a given dispute.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 187 (1971); see also Mastrobuono v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 59-60 (1995) (interpreting a contractual
choice of law provision to govern the applicability of state law and determine the
availability of punitive damages in arbitration).
123. See The Arizona Securities Litigation Reform Act, 1996 Ariz. Sess. Laws Ch.
197, art. 18 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 44-2081 to 2087 (1996)).
124. See I LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 7, at 146-51 ("As a practical matter parsi-
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remedies in certain cases, and now forces plaintiffs to run the
gauntlet in federal court in some cases involving publicly-traded
companies."' This is a further move toward the risky strategy of
financial deregulation.'26 The original conception of federal secu-
rities regulation-that the nation needed federal regulation to
create more stringent standards of conduct than those prevailing
under state law-seems to have been lost in the shuffle.
127
Additionally, to the extent that Congress has now joined the
Court in a bias away from private enforcement, such a bias
seems fundamentally misguided. First, virtually all experts
working in securities law enforcement recognize the crucial role
private enforcement plays in assuring compliance with the feder-
al securities laws. 28 Second, private enforcement, unlike public
monious state budgets have meant understaffing of state securities law programs.");
see also Avery, supra note 2, at 378 ("Depending on the SEC to fill any void causea
by a decrease in meritorious private litigation may be unrealistic in an era of gov-
ernment austerity.").
Experience has taught that the funding of the SEC is, unfortunately, subject to
political caprice. For example, during the 1980s, when regulation of all sorts was not
in vogue, the SEC was chronically underfunded. It was not until the end of the de-
cade, when the pervasive crime in our financial markets began to manifest itself,
that Congress authorized appropriate funding. See The Market Reform Act of 1989:
Joint Hearings before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Sen. Comm. on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong. 11 (1989) [hereinafter Market Reform Act Hearings]
(statement of Sen. Sasser) (noting approval of 18% increase in SEC funding after it
was "underfunded throughout the 1980's at a time when volume and complexity in
the markets has increased enormously").
125. See supra note 13.
126. See supra note 118.
127. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (noting
that the fundamental purpose of federal securities laws is to "'achieve a high stan-
dard of business ethics in the securities industry" (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Re-
search Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963))). The "purpose of the [federal securities
laws] is to expand, not restrict the public's remedies." Sennott v. Rodman &
Renshaw, 414 U.S. 926, 929 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting from order denying cer-
tiorari).
128. The former SEC chief of enforcement stated: "Given the continued growth in
the size and complexity of our securities markets, and the absolute certainty that
persons seeking to perpetrate financial fraud will always be among us, private ac-
tions will continue to be essential to the maintenance of investor protection." Private
Litigation Under the Federal Securities Laws, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Secs.
of the Sen. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 113 (1993)
[hereinafter Private Litigation Hearings] (statement of William R. McLucas, Director,
Division of Enforcement, SEC); see also David S. Ruder, The Development of Legal
Doctrine Through Amicus Participation: The SEC Experience, 1989 WIS. L. REV.
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enforcement, is fundamentally remedial in nature," 9 reflecting
one of the basic goals of the federal securities laws-to provide
remedies to injured investors. 13 0 Third, the compensatory nature
of the federal securities laws is fundamental to investor confi-
dence. 13 1 Investors are most sensitive to their pocketbooks and
only private enforcement truly protects this interest. Moreover,
stacking the deck against securities plaintiffs is a sure-fire way
of destroying the confidence of investors in the fairness of finan-
cial markets.3 2 The preservation of investor confidence is anoth-
er foundational goal of the federal securities laws.
33
The system that worked so well appears to have been taken
for granted. Indeed, Congress appears never to have really con-
sidered issues of investor confidence, de-federalization, enforce-
ment costs, and remediation of investors'losses.3 4 In sum, federal
1167, 1168 (pointing out, as former Chairman of the SEC, that "private securities
litigation plays an essential role in federal securities regulation" and that approxi-
mately 90% of securities cases were privately pursued in 1988); Levitt, supra note
34, at 2 ("[Ihe longtime SEC belief [is] that private rights of action are not only
fundamental to the success of our securities markets, they are an essential comple-
ment to the SEC's own enforcement program."). Indeed, a representative of the
North American Securities Administrators Association, an organization representing
all 50 state securities regulators, stated: "[PIrivate actions . . . are essential to deter
prospective criminals, compensate the victims of fraud, and maintain public confi-
dence in the marketplace." Private Litigation Hearings, supra, at 124 (statement of
Mark J.. Griffen, Director, Division of Securities, Utah Department of Commerce).
129. "The Commission is not authorized to . . . act as a collection agency for an
individual. Investors must seek a financial judgment through civil litigation or bind-
ing arbitration." U.S. SECURITES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, THE WORK OF THE
SEC 36 (1980).
130. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
131. See S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 37 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 715
(statement of Sens. Sarbanes, Bryan, and Boxer) (stating that investor "confidence is
maintained because investors know they have effective remedies against persons who
defraud them").
132. See Securities Litigation Reform Proposals, supra note 68, at 184-93, reprinted
in 1995 U.S.C.C.N. 730, 730 (statement of David J. Guin, on behalf of the Nation-
al Association of Securities and Commercial Law Attorneys) (stating that "reform"
measures "unreasonably tip scales of justice in favor of defendants" and that this
will undermine investor confidence and hurt capital markets).
133. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
134. Certainly, Congress did pay lip service to these goals, stating.
The private securities litigation system is too important to the integrity
of American capital markets to allow this system to be undermined by
those who seek to line their own pockets by bringing abusive and
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law, originally promulgated to enhance the rights of investors
relative to state law13 5 now serves only to diminish the rights of
investors. The recent "reforms" of private securities litigation are
a betrayal of several fundamental goals of the federal securities
laws and expose our financial* system to risks that are not fully
appreciated. 36 A more reactionary cycle could hardly have been
imagined by the promulgators of the federal securities laws in
the early 1930s.13
7
meritless suits. Private securities litigation is an indispensable tool with
which defrauded investors can recover their losses without having to rely
upon government action. Such private lawsuits promote public and global
confidence in our capital markets and help to deter wrongdoing and to
guarantee that corporate officers, auditors, directors, lawyers and others
properly perform their jobs. This legislation seeks to return the securities
litigation system to that high standard.
H.R. REP. 104-369, at 31 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730. The lack
of balance and overbreadth of the PSLRA, however, betrays congressional concern for
these values. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
136. In fact, the SEC has gone on record that it cannot assess whether the PSLRA
is adversely affecting the ability of the federal securities laws to protect investors
because it is too soon after the passage of the Act to assess its impact. See SEC
REPORT, supra note 12, at 63.
137. One visionary was Ferdinand Pecora. Pecora served for 17 months, from Janu-
ary 1933 to July 1934, as counsel to the Senate Committee on Banking and Curren-
cy, during the time of hearings on the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. See
FERDINAND PECORA, WALL STREET UNDER OATH: THE STORY OF OUR MODERN MON-
EY CHANGERS 3 (1939) (Augustus M. Kelley ed., 1973). Pecora published a summary
of those congressional hearings because "[a]fter five short years, we may now need
to be reminded what Wall Street was like before Uncle Sam stationed a policeman
at its corner." Id. at xi.
Pecora was prescient in predicting a failure of public memory:
Under the surface of the governmental regulation of the securities
market, the same forces that produced the riotous speculative excesses of
the "wild bull market" of 1929 still give evidences of their existence and
influence. Though repressed for the present, it cannot be doubted that,
given a suitable opportunity, they would spring back into pernicious ac-
tivity.
Frequently we are told that this regulation has been throttling the
country's prosperity. Bitterly hostile was Wall Street to the enactment of
the regulatory legislation. It now looks forward to the day when it shall,
as it hopes, reassume the reins of its former power.
The public, however, is sometimes forgetful. As its memory of the
unhappy market collapse of 1929 becomes blurred, it may lend at least
one ear to the persuasive voices of The Street subtly pleading for a re-
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The federal securities laws have been a success. For six de-
cades after their promulgation, panics largely have disappeared
and American capital markets have successfully fueled the de-
mand for start-up capital, thereby aiding the economy's ability
to generate continued growth through innovation. 8' The market
disruptions that have occurred have not damaged the economy
and have been temporary in nature."3 9 America's financial sys-
tem has served as a model for the world.'
With such a successful record, any argument for a substantial
structural change should be supported by compelling evidence.141
After all, public participation in the securities markets is at very
high levels.'42 Initial public offerings are soaring.' The stock
market is booming.' The economy is enjoying low inflation, low
unemployment, high growth, and surging productivity.45 The de-
federalization of private securities litigation and the virtual
elimination of private enforcement are substantial structural
turn to the "good old times." Forgotten, perhaps, by some are the shat-
tering revelations of the Senate Committee's investigation.
Id. at ix-x.
138. "By every measure, the United States capital markets are the largest and
strongest in the world." S. REP. No. 104-98, at 37 (1995), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 715.
139. See Market Reform Act Hearings, supra note 124, at 8 (statement of Sen.
Gramm) (noting that the market shock of October 19, 1987 did not damage the
economy).
140. See, e.g., Levitt, supra note 34, at 5 ("Our markets are the best in the world,
partly because our securities laws are the best."); Dr. Gerhard Wegen, Congratula-
tions from Your Continental Cousins, 10b-5: Securities Fraud Regulation From the
European Perspective, 61 FORDHAM L. REV., Annual Survey Issue, May 1993, at S57,
S74 (inviting Rule 10b-5 to "visit" both Western and Eastern Europe); Going for the
Golden Egg, ECONOMIST, Sept. 28-Oct. 4, 1996, at 89-90 (stating that "America has
been much better than Europe at hatching small firms" and detailing European ef-
forts to imitate American securities markets).
141. Or, as the SEC Chairman has said: "You shouldn't fix what ain't 'broke'.'
Levitt, supra note 34, at 5.
142. See supra note 4.
143. See supra note 34.
144. See Jeffery M. Laderman, There's Only One Way to Ride an Aging Bull: Care-
fully, BUS. WEEK, Dec. 29, 1997, at 88 (stating that the S&P 500 stock index had
produced historically unique average annual gains of 28% from 1994-97).
145. See generally New Thinking About the New Economy, BUS. WEEK, May 19,
1997, at 50 (associating recent economic growth with technology-driven increases in
productivity).
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changes. 46 The evidence supporting a finding that the federal
securities laws were in need of repair, however, is based largely
on anecdotal evidence and unproven theories. 47
The putative problem is that federal securities laws are
abused by "entrepreneurial" attorneys bent upon extracting ex-
tortionate settlements from innocent issuers and associated per-
sons. 48 The leverage for these sharp practices is the large costs
of defending such claims through endless pleading and discovery
squabbles to trial.149 Supposedly the merits of these claims do
not matter, and settlement is achieved based upon the costs of
the litigation. 5 ' Stock price volatility invariably leads to claims
of fraud.' 5 ' Thus was born the "litigation explosion" that im-
paired American capital formation, discouraged risk taking, and
enriched lawyers at the expense of American workers.'52 The
story currently makes excellent politics, but there is little or no
evidence to support it.' 53 Scholars have shown an utter absence
of a "litigation explosion," have demonstrated that any evidence
that capital formation has been stunted is weak, and have
opined that the merits matter very much to the price paid for
146. See Simon & Dato, supra note 11, at 960 ("Congress recently passed the most
sweeping revision of the federal securities laws since 1933-34.").
147. See, e.g., Avery, supra note 2; Seligman, supra note 2.
148. See generally H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31-48 (1995), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730-47 (discussing the role attorneys play in the problems with
excessive litigation in the securities context).
149. See id. at 31-32, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730-31.
150. See. id. at 32, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 731.
151. See id. at 31, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730.
152. See 141 CONG. REC. S19,053-54 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Hatch). Senator Hatch stated:
These lawyers are filing these lawsuits so that they can terrorize Ameri-
can companies into paying exorbitant settlements because they know
these companies cannot afford' the high legal fees that would be required
to defend themselves even against meritless lawsuits.
When companies must pay for needless litigation settlement and in-
surance costs with dollars that could be going to create jobs or to further
research and development, consumers and stockholders, virtually all
Americans in fact are hurt. Due to wasted resources, profits and stock
prices are lower than they would otherwise be and the shareholders in
the end lose out. That should not be lost in this debate.
Id.
153. See supra notes 2, 11 and accompanying text.
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settlement of claims." Indeed, this was abundantly clear at the
time the PSLRA became law. 5 5 The growing perception is that
the PSLRA is not about "merits" at all, but rather is simply
about money and influence peddling.'56 This is a dangerous per-
ception.
Moreover, there is even less evidence that the putative solu-
tion to the putative problem will work. 57 The solution embodied
in the PSLRA simply makes it much more difficult and expen-
sive for plaintiffs to prevail and, ironically, makes a merits-
based adjudication even more difficult to obtain."' For example,
PSLRA's class action reforms will lead to even more litigation
regarding who will serve as "lead plaintiff."5" The PSLRA has
the obvious side-effect of throwing out the meritorious with the
frivolous. This is problematic inasmuch as it sacrifices justice in
order to chill the pursuit of weak claims. 6 ° Worse yet, it appears
154. See, e.g., Marino & Marino, supra note 11; Savett, supra note 11.
155. See 141 CONG. REC. S19,057 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Bry-
an) (summarizing the empirical evidence showing no securities litigation explosion
and healthy increases in capital formation).
156. See, e.g., Branson, supra note 58, at 24 (examining supposed policy arguments
in favor of PSLRA and concluding that none was sound and that "[ilnstead, money
($12 million, mostly from the accounting profession) and politics (What politician can
oppose . .. high-tech America?) fueled the rush to enact [the] draconian" PSLRA);
Hufford, supra note 2, at 641 ("Ultimately, the evidence does not support the securi-
ties reform advocates ... the [PSLRA arises from . . . well-funded public relations
and lobbying efforts ... ."); see also 141 CONG. REC. S19,057 (daily ed. Dec. 21,
1995) (statement of Sen. Bryan) (referring to the PSLRA as a "classic case of over-
reaching, and ... an extravagence"). The press has reported widely on the PSLRA
as a prime example of influence peddling. See, e.g., Ann Reilly Dowd, Look Who's
Cashing in on Congress, MONEY, Dec. 1997, at 132 (listing the PSLRA as the top
example of the relationship between laws, money, and lobbying, and noting that
PSLRA was backed by a $29.6 million war chest).
157. As one scholar notes: "Ironically, although the legislation was intended in
large part to reduce what has been perceived by many as an excess of private secu-
rities litigation, the impending clarification and refinement by the courts of the Act's
more novel (and controversial) provisions will likely entail years of litigation." Avery,
supra note 2, at 337.
158. See Savett, supra note 11, at 531 ("The Reform Act produces great delay in
getting the case moving to the merits."). A federal law that seems to extend litiga-
tion is particularly inappropriate in a context in which the government subsidizes
defense costs but not plaintiff costs. See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT
LAW? 144 (1983) (terming deductibility of legal fees for businesses "a gigantic gov-
ernment subsidy").
159. See Avery, supra note 2, at 374.
160. See id. at 377-78 ("To the extent the Act makes meritorious claims more diffi-
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that the "reforms" fail to curb the supposed abuses. Each of the
primary "reforms" suffers from an inherent flaw in logic: increas-
ing the risks of sanctions for claims that fail is useless against
frivolous claims that settle16 ' and fails to recognize that discov-
ery often is needed even to assess the merits of claims.162 Simi-
larly, the PSLRA safe harbor has failed to encourage more
meaningful forward-looking disclosures. 163 Increasing the plead-
ing standards of claims certainly will prevent many claims from
proceeding, but there is no assurance that only the weak claims
will fail to clear this hurdle.'6 Proportionate liability requires a
specific finding by the trier of fact (as to whether the defendant
committed a "knowing" violation of the federal securities laws);
therefore, outside professionals still are faced with the risk of
cult to pursue, it will not have served a worthwhile purpose. The strength of our
markets depends on investor confidence that those markets operate honestly and
fairly.").
161. The sanctions provisions apply only to a "final adjudication." See 15 U.S.C.A.
§§ 77z-1(c)(1), 78u-4(c)(1) (1997).
162. As Mr. Cutting has stated:
The practical effect of fee shifting would be to deter not only frivolous
suits, but meritorious ones as well. This is because the only sensible way
for plaintiffs' attorneys to locate potentially meritorious suits is by filing
suit whenever there is a sudden and significant decrease in stock price.
There is no way to evaluate the merits of a case before filing, because
the essence of the claim is that the managers of the corporation had
knowledge of adverse information that they withheld from the sharehold-
ers. The only method for determining whether a violation actually oc-
curred is through the tools of discovery.
Cutting, supra note 1, at 573 (footnotes omitted).
163. See SEC REPORT, supra note 12, at 75. The SEC continued:
Companies have been reluctant to provide significantly more forward-look-
ing disclosure beyond what they provided prior to enactment of the safe
harbor. Companies are primarily concerned about the lack of judicial
guidance as to the sufficiency of the required "meaningful" cautionary
language and about potential liability under state law where the
statements may not be protected by the federal safe harbor.
Id.
164. See Cutting, supra note 1, at 582. Cutting elaborated:
Like the fee shifting provision, however, the requirement that scienter be
pled with particularity disposes of meritorious claims as well as meritless
ones. Evidence indicating a defendant's state of mind is virtually impos-
sible to discover without conducting [discovery]. Requiring plaintiffs to
produce such evidence before discovery is "putting the cart before the
horse."
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huge jury awards and, thus, pressure to settle.165 Even if the ex-
istence of a problem is conceded, the solutions offered thus far,
specifically the PSLRA, are not narrowly tailored to meet the
problem identified.'66 Indeed, they simply seem to be an arbi-
trary means of terminating or chilling claims. In all, far from
facilitating a merits-based adjudication, the PSLRA seems cer-
tain to further delay any merits reckoning.
Any argument in favor of the PSLRA garners no support from
the record of the securities industry over the past ten or fifteen
years. Although empirical evidence on this score is hard to come
by, most commentators agree that the business of issuing, sell-
ing, or buying securities has not advanced to such an ethical and
fair level that traditional regulatory strictures should be re-
laxed.167 In fact, many believe the contrary to be the case.16
Indeed, the 1980s and early 1990s were a sordid time for fi-
nancial markets in the United States.1 69 Regulators uncovered
massive insider trading scams. 7 ' Outlaws built a new market
165. See Avery, supra note 2, at 378.
166. As one commentator has noted:
Reformers of securities litigation, however, must be ever wary of the dan-
ger of overcompensating for current problems and discouraging the pri-
vate actions necessary to enforce the federal securities laws. The current
proposals are not well tailored to meet the needs of either investors or
small businesses. Perhaps this is because these bills were introduced
more as a political response to a societal perception of excessive litigation
than out of concern over the particular problems of shareholders suits.
Cutting, supra note 1, at 583 (footnote omitted).
167. In the mid-1980s, Texas debated the issue of relaxing securities regulations
and commentators across the country condemned the plan. See Jan Rich, State May
Relax Security Regulations, HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 15, 1985, at 1, available in 1985 WL
3648252. Some, however, supported the plan. See id.
168. See Private Litigation Hearings, supra note 128, at 318 (statement of Ralph
Nader on behalf of Public Citizen) (discussing the increase.in corporate crime during
the 1980s).
169. Senator Specter provided a few cases of massive frauds over the past 15 years
as examples of situations in which private claims under the federal securities laws
assisted large numbers of injured investors. See 141 CONG. REC. S19,046-47 (daily
ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Specter) (citing specifically the Washington
Public Power Supply litigation, involving 26,000 investors who lost $2 billion from
the fraudulent sale of bonds, but who recovered $800 million under pre-PSLRA law).
170. As stated in United States v. Mulheren, 938 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1991):
In the late 1980's a wide prosecutorial net was cast upon Wall
Street. Along with the usual flotsam and jetsam, the government's catch
included some of Wall Street's biggest, brightest, and now infamous-Ivan
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for a new kind of security-junk bonds-on a foundation of fraud
and manipulation.' 7 ' This, in turn, extended to corporate take-
over artists the necessary financial firepower to run roughshod
over, dismantle and dismember long-established businesses. 72
Rogue divisions of previously respected broker-dealers systemat-
ically channeled retirees and IRA funds into reckless limited
partnership investments in blatant breach of all standards of
law and the securities profession. 7 ' Prestigious Wall Street
Boesky, Dennis Levine, Michael Milken, Robert Freeman, Martin Siegel,
Boyd L. Jeffries, and Paul A. Bilzerian--each of whom either pleaded
guilty to or was convicted of crimes involving illicit trading scandals.
Id. at 365; see also JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES 16 (1991) (noting that Den-
nis Levine confessed to $12.6 million in insider-trading profits, Ivan Boesky agreed
to pay $100 million in sanctions, and Michael Milken agreed to pay $600 million);
Dennis B. Levine, The Inside Story of An Inside Trader, FORTUNE, May 21, 1990, at
80 (admitting that Dennis Levine "built $39,750 into $11.5 million" through 7 weeks
of insider trading); The Insider-Trading Case's Cast of Characters, WASH. POST, Sept.
8, 1988, at E4 [hereinafter Insider-Trading] (detailing law enforcement activity
against the web of inside traders on Wall Street).
171. Michael Milken arguably had the most significant impact on the financial
markets of anyone in his generation:
The 42-year-old Drexel Burnham executive is credited with turning
junk bonds into a financing mechanism for corporate growth,
restructurings and takeovers, and his salesmanship and long work days
have kept the market in these securities humming.
In the last several years, Milken has helped corporate raiders raise
the cash to take over some of America's largest corporations, thereby
affecting the fate of their employees, communities and shareholders.
Along the way he has attracted a large group of individual and institu-
tional investors who constitute a ready market for the high-yielding
bonds.
Insider-Trading, supra note 170, at E4; see also BENJAMIN J. STEIN, A LICENSE TO
STEAL: THE UNTOLD STORY OF MICHAEL MILKEN AND THE CONSPIRACY TO BILK THE
NATION 15 (1992) (discussing the impact of Milken's use of junk bonds as a "land-
scape . . . littered with the ruins of a number of other financial giants").
172. Two such businesses are Pacific Lumber Company and Fischbach Corporation.
See In re Ivan F. Boesky Sec. Litig., 888 F. Supp. 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (recounting
the fate of Pacific Lumber); SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 837 F. Supp.
587 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (recounting the fate of Fischbach).
173. As the SEC chairman has noted:
Take the sale of $8 billion of limited partnerships during the 1980s by
Prudential Securities. Sadly, many people saving for retirement were mis-
led about the risks of these investments. The SEC, with the help of state
regulators, investigated and reached a settlement with Prudential at the
end of last year, which has already returned almost $825 million to more
than 100,000 defrauded investors.
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firms bilked savings and loans, banks, insurance companies, and
even municipalities on a scale previously thought impossible. 174
No market was safe from such skulduggery, as one pillar of Wall
Street even manipulated the market for U.S. Treasury obliga-
tions.175 This pervasive run of fraud, theft, and malfeasance im-
posed astounding costs upon our economy; trillions were lost, 76
much of which is still being paid off. Such frauds militate
strongly against relaxing any sanctions available under the fed-
eral securities laws.177
Arthur Levitt, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Speech to Na-
tional Association of Investors Corporation, Memphis, Tenn., Aug. 27, 1995, available
in 1995 WL 520185; see also KURT EICHENWALD, SERPENT ON THE ROCK 7 (1995)
("More than $8 billion worth of risky partnerships packaged by Prudential-Bache
collapsed after they had been falsely sold as safe and secure."); Chuck Hawkins, The
Mess at Pru-Bache: Questions About the Broker's Dealings Could Cause Long Term
Damage, Investigations, BUS. WEEK, Mar. 4, 1991, at 66 (stating that Prudential-
Bache Securities, Inc. sold more than $6 billion in limited partnerships to 100,000
investors, ivho suffered huge losses without disclosing conflicts of interest, or crimi-
nal convictions of key promoters).
174. See, e.g., STEIN, supra note 171, at 181-82.
175. On May 2, 1992, Salomon Brothers agreed to pay fines and civil sanctions
totaling $290 million to compensate those damaged by violations of law in connection
with Salomon's submission of false bids at Treasury securities auctions. Chairman
Breeden commented:
Salomon's numerous violations of the securities laws were extremely seri-
ous and involved huge amounts of securities purchases in a wrongful
manner. Salomon's pattern of submitting false bids created a risk to the
integrity of the government securities market, which is a market on
which the federal government, and ultimately all federal taxpayers, de-
pend. The failure of Salomon's senior management to alert the appropri-
ate regulatory authorities when they first learned of the violations signifi-
cantly compounded the gravity of the violations.
U.S. SECURmTIEs AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, NEWS RELEASE, SEC Files and Settles
Salomon Brothers Case, May 20, 1992, available in 1992 WL 110972; see also The
Activities of Salomon Brothers, Inc. in Treasury Bond Auctions: Hearings before the
Subcomm. on Sec. of the Sen. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 102d
Cong. 16 (1991) (statement of Sen. Jim Sasser) (recounting fallout from the deregula-
tion of the 1980s).
176. The bank crisis of the 1980s alone cost about $1 trillion. See Ramirez, supra
note 120, at 629. While not all of this is attributable to misconduct in connection
with securities transactions, at least 55 of the federally insured savings and loans
that failed were Drexel Burnham clients, including the largest and costliest failure,
the notorious Charles Keating dominated Lincoln Savings & Loan Association. Also,
of the 25 largest bankruptcies between 1980 and 1991, 14 were Drexel Burnham cli-
ents. See STEIN, supra note 171, at 206-07.
177. As one state enforcement officer argued:
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Other economic developments support the argument against
imposing restrictions upon investor remedies. In fact, public par-
ticipation in, and reliance upon, the financial markets is greater
than ever.1 8 When the baby-boom generation begins to retire at
the end of the next decade, the capital markets will be expected
largely to finance this huge claim on capital.'79 This could well
begin an unstable economic era that will test investors' confi-
dence in the financial system.80 When Congress was debating
the PSLRA, this issue caused concern among some members.'"
Consequently, the PSLRA included a provision directing the
SEC to study the impact of the PSLRA upon the investments of
senior citizens. 82 Ironically, that study concluded that, while
seniors may be susceptible to fraud and abuse, it was "too soon"
The excesses of the 1980's and early 1990's in the financial services are-
na have left investors with a deep-and all too well justified-sense of
concern. During the last decade, we witnessed financial frauds and scan-
dals of historic proportions: The Salomon Brothers fraud in the govern-
ment securities marketplace; Steven Wymer, BCCI and BNL; Charles
Keating and Lincoln Savings; taxpayer bailouts for the savings and loan
debacle; the FBI sting operation at the Chicago commodities markets;
and the so-called "Den of Thieves" ring of junk bond king Michael
Milken, Ivan Boesky, Dennis Levine and Marty Siegel. And, every day
small investors are victimized in less notorious-but equally devastat-
ing--cases of fraud and abuse.
It is against this backdrop that the broader and more complex issues
raised by proponents of litigation "reform" must be considered.
Private Litigation Hearings, supra note 128, at 123 (statement of Mark J. Griffen,
Director, Division of Securities, Utah Department of Commerce).
178. See supra note 4.
179. See SEC REPORT, supra note 12, at 1-2.
180. Economists recognize that the baby boom generation has rocked our economy
for nearly 50 years. First came the school shortage. Then, the cultural phenomenon
of the 1960s. During the 1970s, this population surge reached maturity and de-
pressed productivity and savings, as the baby boom generation struggled to finance
homes and education, and entered the labor market. Now, in their prime, the baby
boom has discovered the stock market. See generally Economic Implications of
Changing Population Trends, 72 FED. RESERVE BULL. 815, 821 (1986) (contending
that many older people derive a portion of their income from their assets). If they
rock the capital markets early next century, the PSLRA may come to be viewed as
an unmitigated disaster.
181. See 141 CONG. REC. S19,040 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Sarbanes).
182. See 141 CONG. REC. S9224 (daily ed. June 28, 1995) (instructing the SEC to
determine whether investors who are senior citizens require greater protection
against securities fraud).
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to determine the impact of the PSLRA upon this important
group of investors. 183 This is, however, an issue that cannot be
left to chance. These investors must have the highest degree of
confidence in the fairness of our financial markets because they
will control a large source of capital. Even now, investors over
sixty-five own, directly or indirectly, one-third of all shares; by
2020, there will be more than twenty million new seniors.' The
aging population also means that there is no crisis in the securi-
ties industry, as profits are at record levels.
18 5
Neither the regulatory record of the securities industry nor
the economic circumstances facing that industry can justify the
restriction of investor rights that has occurred as a result of re-
cent court decisions and the PSLRA. Moreover, even if there is a
problem with abusive class actions, the PSLRA, is hopelessly
overbroad and does not really address how to stem such abuses.
Instead, the PSLRA merely rigs private securities claims so that
defendants almost always win. The PSLRA is a betrayal of the
policy foundations of the federal securities laws and a threat to
the long term stability of our securities markets.
C. Why the Merits of the PSLRA Matter
This Article does not argue that frivolous lawsuits do not ex-
ist, or that such lawsuits do not cause injuries to innocent defen-
dants, investors, the marketplace, and the economy generally.
Discouraging frivolous lawsuits is a laudable goal. Allowing in-
vestors to have greater control over class actions also is laudable
and the PSLRA includes innovative provisions for achieving this
goal. "'86 Although empirical evidentiary support for an explosion
of frivolous litigation is weak,8 7 the anecdotal evidence that
183. See SEC REPORT, supra note 1'2, at 1.
184. See id.
185. See David Henry, Street Warning: Business is Really Bustling, USA TODAY,
Nov. 11, 1996, at 2B ("Pretax profit for the industry is climbing to a record this
year... toward $13.3 billion.").
186. For example, even staunchly pro-investor regulators expressed support for
reigning in professional plaintiffs and improving disclosure of settlement terms in
class actions. See Securities Litigation Reform Proposals, supra note 68, at 209-12
(statement of Mark J. Griffin on behalf of the North American Securities Adminis-
trators Association).
187. It is noteworthy that securities law is not the only area in which the debate
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there are some abuses is strong.' s Expert after expert testified
to serious problems emerging in the private securities litigation
arena."9 A parade of SEC commissioners attested to strong indi-
cations that the private securities enforcement system was not
operating correctly. 9 ° In fact, President Clinton did not oppose
the goals of the PSLRA, only certain provisions that he thought
would "have the effect of closing the courthouse door on inves-
tors who have legitimate claims."' 9' The PSLRA simply goes too
far given the scope of the problem.
Regardless of the evidentiary support for the PSLRA, the con-
stituency that supported it is unlikely to disappear anytime
soon. Indeed, it appears that the movement is toward more insu-
lation from liability rather than less.'92 This constituency has
broad bipartisan support and is well funded.'93 Forcing indus-
tries to shoulder large litigation expenses because of the riski-
ness of their activities serves no interest, particularly not the
interest of shareholders and investors whose profits decline as a
result.'94 In the final analysis, shareholders of corporations pay-
of a litigation explosion is raging: "Reformist advocacy based upon the existence of a
litigation crisis, therefore, is founded upon impressionistic accounts that cannot be
corroborated (and are, in fact, contradicted) by hard evidence." THOMAS E.
CARBONNEAU, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 242 (1989) (citing Marc Galanter,
Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know And Don't Know (And Think We
Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4
(1983)).
188. As Senator Dodd, one of the PSLRA's sponsors, pointed out, "the record is re-
plete" with examples of abuse. See Securities Litigation Reform Proposals, supra note
68, at 2-3 (statement of Sen. Dodd).
189. See id.
190. Richard M. Phillips and Gilbert C. Miller, The Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995: Rebalancing Litigation Risks and Rewards for Class Action
Plaintiffs, Defendants and Lawyers, 51 BUS. LAW. 1009, 1025-26 (1996) (summarizing
testimony of SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, former Chairman Richard C. Breeden,
former Chairman John Shad, former Acting Chairman Charles C. Cox, and former
Commissioner J. Carter Breese, Jr.).
191. 141 CONG. REC. H15,214 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995) (veto message of Pres.
Clinton).
192. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
194. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 9 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 688
("[Liong-term investors ultimately end up paying the costs associated with the [frivo-
lous] lawsuits.").
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ing large securities settlements also are punished even though
they may not have participated in the conduct giving rise to the
claims.195
Moreover, perceptions are important for issuers of securities
as well as for investors. If the perception is that "going public" is
accompanied by an arbitrary litigation tax, more costly sources
of capital may be utilized and inefficiencies created. Similarly, if
the perception is that there is an "innovation tax," some compa-
nies, especially new or smaller companies, may be more risk
averse than is necessary.' 96 To the extent that the PSLRA ad-
dresses these concerns, it is difficult to argue that the Act has
no merit. Quite simply, it is a salutary goal to eliminate frivo-
lous litigation, and the securities business, because of its com-
plexity and economic importance, may justify special litigation
rules to quell such suits.
The issue therefore, becomes one of balance. The benefits of
private enforcement must be balanced against the dangers of
"strike suits." Any special litigation rules for securities claims
must be tested against this balance, and the set of special rules
that achieves the most promising balance should be implement-
ed. The next section of this Article will demonstrate that arbi-
tration is the special litigation procedure that achieves the best
balance. Arbitration can thrust the merits onto center stage and
195. This concern often seems to influence the judiciary. See Eckstein v. Balcor
Film Investors, 58 F.3d 1162, 1168 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that securities claims are
often "no favor to investors as a whole (who in the end must pay anticipated judg-
ments)"). PSLRA supporters relied on this point: "The overall point . . . is . . . there
is no division between companies and investors .. . that which damages the compa-
ny, damages the owners . . . who are the investors." 141 CONG. REC. S17,942 (daily
ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Bennett).
196. See Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 189 (1994). The
Supreme Court stated:
Newer and smaller companies may find it difficult to obtain advice from
professionals. A professional may fear that a newer or smaller company
may not survive and that business failure would generate securities liti-
gation against the professional, among others. In addition, the increased
costs incurred by professionals because of the litigation and settlement
costs under 10b-5 may be passed on to their client companies, and in
turn incurred by the company's investors, the intended beneficiaries of
the statute.
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slash defense costs-these benefits are fatal to strike suits and
can restore fairness and efficiency to capital markets.
II. ARBITRATION: THE ROAD NOT TAKEN
Arbitration has been a favored method of dispute resolution,
as a matter of federal law, since 1925 when Congress enacted
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).'97 After the FAA, many
courts remained skeptical that arbitration was an appropriate
means of achieving substantial justice, and they were wary of
imposing arbitration in situations in which parties did not enjoy
equal bargaining power. 198 By the 1980s, however, the Supreme
Court's attitude towards arbitration had changed. 9 9 The Court
has stated that because of the strong federal policy favoring
arbitration, "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable is-
sues" in a given case "should be resolved in favor of arbitra-
tion.20 0 Consequently, the Court has held that in areas involving
interstate commerce, such as securities,20 ' state laws restricting
197. United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amend-
ed at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1994)). The United States Arbitration Act came to be known
as the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) following Congress's deletion in 1947 of the
section naming the statute the United States Arbitration Act. See IAN R. MACNEIL,
AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION
231 n.48 (1992). The FAA states that "[a] written provision in . . . a contract evi-
dencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforce-
able, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). The FAA further provides that federal courts shall
"stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with
the terms of the agreement." 9 U.S.C. § 3. Congress enacted the FAA to extinguish
judicial hostility toward arbitration. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 96, at 1, 2 (1924).
198. See, e.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 202-03 (1956)
(holding that arbitration substantively affects parties' rights because arbitration pro-
cedures do not provide sufficient safeguards); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435
(1953) (stating that arbitration does not comport with the fact that the Securities
Act "was drafted with an eye to the disadvantages under which buyers labor").
199. See generally Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the
Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 644-74
(1996) (tracing the evolution of the Court's approach to arbitration).
200. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp, 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)
(recognizing a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration").
201. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 430 (stating that a margin agreement governing a se-
curities transaction involves interstate commerce). The Court has held that "involving
19991 ARBITRATION AND REFORM 1097
arbitration are preempted if they interfere with the arbitration
of suits. 2
02
A. A Short History of Securities Arbitration
The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) began to offer an arbi-
tration forum for the resolution of securities disputes in 1872. °3
The National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) adopted
its securities arbitration procedures in 1968.2° The NYSE and
NASD are the two largest self-regulatory organizations (SROs)
registered under the Exchange Act.205 Operating under the close
supervision of the SEC, they provide pervasive regulation of the
broker-dealer industry.0 6 Investors initially did not use either of
these arbitration fora frequently. First, the SROs created these
fora to address a narrow universe of securities disputes-those
between securities brokers and their customers.0 7 Second, even
with respect to this limited universe, the use of these arbitration
procedures was voluntary until the 1980s. °8
commerce," as used in the FAA, is the functional equivalent of "affecting com-
merce'--meaning that Congress has exercised its commerce power to its fullest ex-
tent. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 277 (1995).
202. See, e.g., Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996) (holding that
the FAA preempted a Montana statute requiring that a predispute arbitration clause
be on the first page of a contract); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Lewis, 751 F. Supp.
205 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (holding that a Florida statute requiring parties to provide an
option for nonindustry arbitration violated the Supremacy Clause).
203. See HOBLIN, supra note 16, at 1-2.
204. See id.; Masucci, supra note 17, at 185.
205. See Katsoris, McMahon, supra note 17, at 1130.
206. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f, 78o-3, 78s (1994) (providing the statutory basis
for the self-regulatory power of national securities exchanges and registered secu-
rities organizations, as well as the close supervision of such SROs by the SEC). The
SEC is given broad powers over SRO rules. See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) ('The [Securities
and Exchange] Commission, by rule, may abrogate, add to, and delete from . . . the
rules of a self-regulatory organization . . . as the Commission deems necessary or
appropriate . . . ."); see also VI Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 7, at 2713-23 (dis-
cussing generally the process and potential limitations of this power).
207. See HOBLIN, supra note 16, at 2-3 to 2-4 ("SROs by rule require that their
members consent to arbitrate disputes... with their customers.... [Account
Agreements] with arbitration clauses very often exist between members and their
customers . . ").
208. See generally Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (holding predispute arbitra-
tion agreements unenforceable under the Securities Act).
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The Court's decision in Wilko v. Swan, which held that claims
under the Securities Act were not arbitrable pursuant to
predispute arbitration agreements, limited widespread arbitra-
tion of securities disputes in the brokerage industry."' The
Wilko decision evinced judicial hostility toward arbitration. The
Court seemed uncertain that an arbitration panel could protect
a plaintiffs rights under the federal securities laws because the
arbitrators were not required to issue rulings in compliance with
law, did not have to explain their decisions, and were not subject
to meaningful judicial review." 0 The Court held that the federal
securities laws guaranteed court-based judicial proceedings and
that this guarantee could not be waived.21 '
More recently, in Shearson lAmerican Express, Inc. v.
McMahon," the Supreme Court held that securities claims
could be subject to predispute arbitration agreements.1 3 The
Court based its reversal of the Wilko approach on the fact that
commercial arbitration had become more common and that secu-
rities arbitration involving SROs operated under the close super-
vision of the SEC.2"4 Fundamentally, the Supreme Court rejected
209. See id. at 427, 438.
210. See id. at 436-37 (stating that "the protective provisions of the Securities Act
require the exercise of judicial direction" and arbitrators unbound by law are not
adequate to secure the protections of the Securities Act for investors); see also Dan-
iel R. Waltcher, Note, Classwide Arbitration and 10b-5 Claims in the Wake of
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 380, 382 (1989).
211. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434-35. Section 14 of the Securities Act provides that
"[any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security
to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of the rules and regu-
lations of the [Securities and Exchange] Commission shall be void." 15 U.S.C. § 77n.
212. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
213. See id. at 238. The Supreme Court had signaled a retreat from Wilko in two
cases that were decided between Wilko and McMahon. See Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221, 223-24 (1985) (holding that the FAA requires courts
to compel arbitration of pendent arbitrable claims); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417
U.S. 506, 519-20 (1974) (holding that an international contract provision requiring
arbitration applies to Rule 10b-5 claims).
214. See Wilko, 482 U.S. at 233. For example, the 1975 amendments provide that
the [Securities and Exchange] Commission, by rule, may abrogate, add to, and
delete from . . . the rules of a self-regulatory organization . . . as the Com-
mission deems necessary or appropriate to insure the fair administration
of the self-regulatory organization, to conform its rules to requirements of
this chapter and the rules and regulations thereunder applicable to such
organization, or otherwise in furtherance of the purpose of this chapter.
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the suspicion of arbitration evinced in Wilko and clearly stated
that arbitration, particularly under the watchful eye of the SEC,
is a reliable and fair means of adjudicating broker-customer
disputes.215 It is difficult to take issue with this conclusion. In
fact, plaintiffs in such actions are increasingly comfortable arbi-
trating these claims.216 Although it is impossible to determine
with precision whether investors are treated "fairly" in arbitrat-
ing claims against brokers, all of the available evidence suggests
that investors fare at least as well as dealers in federal court.217
Currently, virtually all customers may compel their brokers to
submit disputes to industry-sponsored arbitration by virtue of
their required membership in various SROs and the rules of
such organizations. 218 Additionally, the majority of customers
15 U.S.C. § 78s(c). The Court's holding is limited to cases in which the SEC exercis-
es oversight over the arbitration forum rules. See Wilko, 482 U.S. at 234. Given that
McMahon involved claims under the Exchange Act and not the Securities Act, see
id., Wilko was not actually overturned until 1989. See Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481, 483 (1989) (holding that
predispute arbitration agreements are enforceable as to claims under the Securities
Act).
215. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 231-34; see also Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at
486 ("[Rlesort to the arbitration process does not inherently undermine any of the
substantive rights afforded to petitioners under the Securities Act.").
216. Indeed, the evidence is mounting that investors actually prevail more often in
arbitration against broker-dealers than they do in court, especially given the recent
"reforms" promulgated by both Congress and the Court. See Marc I. Steinberg, Secu-
rities Arbitration: Better for Investors than the Courts?, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1503,
1531 (1996) ("The final analysis is that investors today likely fare better in arbitra-
tion than they would in federal court."); see also Lloyd S. Clareman, The New Rules
of Suing a Broker, FORTUNE, 1991 Investor's Guide, Fall 1990, at 207-08 ("Arbitra-
tion today offers more advantages than disadvantages to aggrieved investors.");
Kristen Davis, Battle Your Broker and Win, CHANGING TIMES, May 1991, at 41-43
(quoting sources as stating that arbitration is the "preferred" means of pursuing
claims against brokers). But see, e.g., Daniel McGinn, Can't Get No Satisfaction,
NEWSWEEK, Aug. 29, 1994, at 41 (stating that both investors and brokers are dissat-
isfied with securities arbitration); Jane Bryant Quinn, Seeking Justice, NEWSWEEK,
Sept. 4, 1995, at 37 (arguing that brokers have the "upper hand" in securities arbi-
tration).
217. See supra notes 22, 216 and accompanying text; infra note 235 and accom-
panying text.
218. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8) (requiring membership in either a national securities
exchange or a registered securities association, such as the NASD). The SEC has
approval authority over all SRO rules, including provisions relating to arbitration
procedures. See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1), (c). All SROs require their member broker-
dealers to submit to arbitration at the request of a customer. See UNIF. CODE OF
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generally are required to agree to arbitrate disputes with their
brokers by operation of arbitration clauses within account secu-
rities agreements.219 Thus, insofar as broker-customer disputes
are concerned, arbitration is the pervasive means of dispute res-
olution. The NASD sponsors the most important arbitration fo-
rum, processing eighty-five percent of all broker-customer arbi-
tration disputes.22 ° The NASD closed 4,561 cases in 1994, and
the average time for resolution of a case was 10.4 months.221 In
addition, a study commissioned by the NYSE showed that arbi-
tration in the securities brokerage industry has achieved a sig-
nificantly lower cost for parties in resolving these kinds of dis-
putes.222 The most recent data also suggest that plaintiffs prevail
as much in arbitration as in court.
22
Arbitration between brokers and customers in the securities
brokerage industry has had a long period to develop; therefore,
the rules now governing such arbitrations are uniform. In addi-
tion, the SROs have adopted the Uniform Code of Arbitration
promulgated by SICA.2 ' The Uniform Code provides that the
rules of evidence do not apply,2 25 but may serve as a guideline to
arbitrators to exclude evidence.2 2' The Code authorizes virtually
ARBITRATION §1(a) (1996). The SEC sponsored the creation of SICA, which assesses
the efficacy of arbitration at the SROs and proposes improvements. See id. at 488-
90. SICA has promulgated the Uniform Code of Arbitration for securities disputes,
which has been adopted, in all major aspects, by every SRO. See id. at 489-90.
219. See supra note 17; see also ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 21,
at 13 ("IMlost individual investors have entered into agreements that contain
predispute arbitration clauses.").
220. See Masucci, supra note 17, at 188.
221. See id.
222. See FLETCHER, supra note 17, at § 4.7 (citing studies showing that arbitration
costs only 40% of court litigation); see also G. Richard Shell, Arbitration and Corpo-
rate Governance, 67 N.C. L. REV. 517, 521 n.24 (1989) (revealing that defending a
suit in arbitration costs an average of $8,000 compared to the average $20,000 spent
in court).
223. See FLETCHER, supra note 17, § 4.2 (showing that plaintiffs recover more money
and prevail more often in arbitration than in court).
224. See generally Katsoris, SICA, supra note 17, at 490 (commenting that it is the
role of the arbitrator to determine the admissibility of evidence, unconstrained by
the Federal Rules of Evidence).
225. See id. at 513 (discussing UNIF. CODE OF ARBITRATION § 21).
226. See Mary Margaret L. O'Donnell, Note, The Future of Mandatory Arbitration
Agreements in Employment Contracts: What Huertebise v. Reliable Business Com-
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no motion practice, discourages depositions, and allows for other
discovery by informal means.22 The Code provides for conferenc-
es with an arbitrator to resolve any discovery disputes.228 A pan-
el of three arbitrators eventually hears the underlying dispute 29
and issues an award within thirty days, which must then be
paid within thirty days of the panel's decision."'0 The arbitrators
are individuals with substantial securities experience and are
required to undertake significant arbitration training.23' The
Rules also regulate the composition of arbitration panels: no
more than one out of three arbitrators may be from the securi-
ties industry, and parties may challenge arbitrators peremptori-
ly or for cause. 2 As with all arbitrations, appeal rights are
quite limited. Absent a manifest disregard of the law, the
arbitrators' decision typically will stand.2"
puters Will Mean For Michigan, 44 WAYNE L. REV. 231, 252 (1998) (arguing that
those people who would prefer to have arbitrators follow the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence should include a provision to that effect in their contracts).
227. See Katsoris, SICA, supra note 17, at 511-13 (discussing UNIF. CODE OF ARBI-
TRATION § 20).
228. See id.
229. See UNIF. CODE OF ARBITRATION § 8(a)(1).
230. See id. § 28(d),(g).
231. See ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 21, at 107-13 (reviewing ar-
bitrator training programs and making suggestions for improvement).
232. See UNIF. CODE OF ARBITRATION §§ 8, 10.
233. The "manifest disregard of the law" standard of review has evolved from dicta
in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953). The majority of courts of appeals
have adopted this standard. See, e.g., Willemijn Houdstermaatschappij, BV v. Stan-
dard Microsystems Corp., 103 F.3d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1997) (reversing district court's
vacatur of award); Health Services Management Corp. v. Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253,
1267 (7th Cir. 1992) (sustaining award); AG. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. McCollough,
967 F.2d 1401, 1402-03 (9th Cir. 1992) (reversing district court's vacatur of award);
Kanuth v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, Inc., 949 F.2d 1175, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (sus-
taining award); Upshur Coal Corp. v. UMWA, Dist. 31, 933 F.2d 225, 228-29 (4th
Cir. 1991) (reversing district court's vacatur of award); Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914
F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1990) (upholding award because the correct legal interpretation
was not glaringly obvious, even if the arbitrators committed legal error); Tanoma
Mining Co. v. Local 1269, UMWA, 896 F.2d 745, 749 (3d Cir. 1990) (reversing dis-
trict court's vacatur of award); Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. J.V.B. Indus., Inc.,
894 F.2d 862, 866 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that errors in interpretation do not con-
stitute manifest disregard); Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 847 F.2d 631, 634
(10th Cir. 1988) (sustaining award). In addition, section 10 of the FAA provides cer-
tain statutory bases for vacating arbitration awards involving procedural deficiencies.
See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994).
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The system of securities arbitration for broker-customer dis-
putes has been under intense scrutiny for many years. The Gen-
eral Accounting Office (GAO) has studied the fairness of the sys-
tem and has concluded that it is not inherently biased in favor
of the industry.234 Other scholarly studies of the fairness of arbi-
tration in the SRO fora generally have concluded that investors
are given "fair" treatment.3 5 Over the years, the success rate for
claimants in SRO arbitration proceedings has remained remark-
ably close to fifty percent.3 6 This seems to rebut any systematic
unfairness in these proceedings, even though a more telling com-
parison would be a comparative analysis between results
234. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SECURITIES ARBITRATION-How INVES-
TORS FARE 60 (1992). The GAO also assessed the fairness of arbitration at the
SROs in the specific context of employment discrimination claims involving employ-
ees of brokers-dealers. Again, it found no unfair bias. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNT-
ING OFFICE, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION-How REGISTERED REPRESENTATIVES
FARE IN DISCRnMNATION SUITS 2 (1994).
235. See Shelly R. James, Note, Arbitration in the Securities Field: Does the Pres-
ent System of Arbitration Between Small Investors and Brokerage Firms Really Pro-
tect Anyone?, 21 J. CORP. L. 363, 376-84, 389 (1996) (under.aking a quantitative
and qualitative analysis of 293 randomly selected arbitration awards and concluding
that, statistically, arbitration appears "fair" and that a "rhetorical" analysis "denies
the existence of bias in arbitration"). Although the James sample is limited, and
the "rhetorical" analysis somewhat novel, its conclusions are consistent with other
studies. See, e.g., William A. Gregory & William J. Schneider, Securities Arbitration:
A Need for Continued Reform, 17 NOVA L. REV. 1223, 1241 (1993) (finding that cus-
tomers prevailed in 56% of arbitrations in 1989 and 59% in 1990). Gregory &
Schneider conclude:
It may be that a fifty percent win ratio paying out 30 cents on the dol-
lar is quite generous to customers based on the facts of the individual
cases. Unfortunately, there is no way of telling without the written opin-
ions of arbitrators. Under the present state of securities arbitration, our
intuition may be the only guiding light. The industry's actions do not
seem to support its contention that investors fare better in industry
arbitration. With the securities industry feverishly fighting to uphold
[Predispute Arbitration Agreements] at every turn... it would seem
that investors are the ones getting the short end of the stick ....
Id. at 1242-43. The inference that arbitration is unfair because the securities indus-
try "feverishly" fights to uphold it seems suspect. It may be that because of lower
costs and quicker resolutions, arbitration is both fair and less costly to defendants
and plaintiffs than conventional litigation. See James, supra, at 375. James also
found that in cases in which a claimant was represented by counsel, claimants en-
joyed a 60% success rate. See id. at 380.
236. See Katsoris, SICA, supra note 17, at 564 (showing that public investors pre-
vailed at a rate of 50.29% from 1993 to 1995).
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reached in litigation and arbitration."' The SEC also has con-
ducted several studies of the broker-customer arbitration system
and has not found any inherent unfairness. For example, the
SEC concluded a review of the fairness of arbitration procedures
used at the SROs in 1987 and made specific recommendations
for improving the process. These recommendations ultimately
led to a number of revisions that the SEC approved."3 ' In addi-
tion, the accounting firm of Deloitte, Haskins & Sells conducted
a comprehensive study of the fairness of industry-sponsored ar-
bitration in 1988 on behalf of the NYSE." 9 The study found arbi-
tration to be less costly and speedier than litigation." The SEC
made its own independent examination of the Deloitte study,
and found that there was "no significant difference in the
amount recovered by plaintiffs in litigated cases vis-a-vis arbi-
trated cases." ' SICA, an organization comprised of members of
the public and representatives of the securities industry that
helps monitor and improve the arbitration system, has produced
a series of reports to the SEC to further such fairness goals.242
237. See supra note 223.
238. See Order Approving SRO Arbitration Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
26805, 54 Fed. Reg. 21,144 (May 16, 1989).
239. See Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, Study on Behalf of New York Stock Exchange
(1988), reprinted in HOBLIN, supra note 16, at XXIII-10 to XXIII-16.
240. See id. at XXII-12.
241. 2 SECURITES ARBITRATION COMMENTATOR No. 4, at 4 (Apr. 1989) (citing
Memorandum from Kenneth Lehn, Chief Economist for the SEC, to Catherine
McGuire, Division of Market Regulation (Feb. 24, 1989)).
242. More precisely:
In ... comments to the Commission, several self-regulatory organi-
zations and [others] proposed that a securities industry task force be es-
tablished to consider the matter of developing a uniform arbitration code
and the means for establishing a more efficient, economic and appropri-
ate mechanism for resolving investor disputes involving small sums of
money. In accordance with such proposals and at the initiative of the
self-regulatory members, a Securities Industry Conference on Arbitra-
tion ... was established in early 1977. Subsequently the Commission
invited proposals from the Conference which would address, among other
matters, improved methods for the resolution. of investors' small claims.
SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, THIRD REPORT OF THE SECURI-
TIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION 2 (Jan. 31, 1980) (on file with author) (citing Implementation of an
Investor Dispute Resolution System, Exchange Act Release No. 34-13470, [1977-1978
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In 1978, SICA proposed the Uniform Arbitration Code.24 SICA
has also continuously proposed revisions to arbitration proce-
dures, written public education brochures, and monitored statis-
tics relating to industry arbitration results.2" In addition, the
NASD, as the sponsor of the largest industry-sponsored arbitra-
tion forum, appointed a task force headed by former SEC Chair-
man David Ruder to study the securities arbitration process and
make suggestions for its improvement. 45 This task force also
found arbitration to be a "fair" method for the resolution of dis-
putes.246 Even Congress has been involved in scrutinizing the
fairness and appropriateness of industry-sponsored arbitra-
tion.24" The intense scrutiny of the securities arbitration process
in the brokerage industry has made it increasingly more accept-
able to the public.
248
The SEC specifically has addressed the need for ADR propos-
als, such as the one in this Article, to serve as a means of resolv-
ing the tension inherent in discerning frivolous suits from mer-
itorious ones.249 The SEC has long supported arbitration as a
means of fairly resolving securities disputes, at least in the
securities brokerage industry.250 No one, however, has promul-
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) %1 81,136 (Apr. 26, 1977)).
243. See Katsoris, SICA, supra note 17, at 490.
244. See generally SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, EIGHTH RE-
PORT OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION (June 1994) (on file
with author).
245. See Katsoris, SICA, supra note 17, at 528.
246. See ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 21, at 1.
247. In fact, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce requested the GAO
study. See HOBLIN, supra note 16, at XXXV-2.
248. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
249. See Securities Litigation Reform Proposals, supra note 68, at 247, 250
(statement of Arthur Levitt, SEC Chairman).
250. See Brief for Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae at 13-21,
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (No. 86-44). The
SEC argued:
The view of arbitration on which Wilko rested is today inappropriate in
cases involving disputes between registered broker-dealers and their cus-
tmers.... [Given the SEC's broad regulatory authority], the suspicion
of arbitration on which Wilko rested is inappropriate, and an agreement
to arbitrate accordingly should not be deemed a waiver of rights under
the Exchange Act.
Id. at 13. The SEC has not always been so pro-arbitration. In 1983, the SEC pro-
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gated a serious proposal for expanded ADR of private securities
claims. Certainly Congress has given short-shrift to the potential
improvements that ADR can bring to this vital area.251 The expe-
rience from arbitration in the broker-dealer industry, however,
demonstrates that securities disputes can be resolved fairly and
efficiently through ADR, particularly when regulated by a prom-
inent administrative agency with recognized expertise such as
the SEC.2"2
The key issue is whether it is possible to implement an ADR
mechanism that can deal well with both frivolous claims and
meritorious claims in the context of securities disputes involving
mulgated 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2 to regulate predispute arbitration clauses in broker-
dealer customer agreements. See Recourse to the Courts Notwithstanding Arbitration
Clauses, Exchange Act Release No. 34-20397, 48 Fed. Reg. 53,404 (Nov. 28, 1983).
After the McMahon decision, the SEC rescinded this Rule. See Rescission of Rule
Governing Use of Predispute Arbitration Clauses, Exchange Act Release 34-25034, 52
Fed. Reg. 39,216 (Oct. 21, 1987).
251. See STAFF REPORT ON PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION, STAFF REPORT PRE-
PARED AT THE DIRECTION OF SEN. CHRISTOPHER DODD, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMM. ON
SEC. OF THE SEN. COIML ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIERS, UNITED
STATES SENATE 51 (May 12, 1994), reprinted in Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Sec. of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong.
(1994) (stating that ADR does not always succeed).
252. As one scholar commented:
Congress created the Commission as an expert agency with the capacity
to address significant problems affecting the nation's securities markets.
Congress also created the Commission as an agency that could thought-
fully address problems too politically charged to be easily resolved on
Capitol Hill. Congress then delegated to the Commission substantial au-
thority to define the contours of market activity that would create liabili-
ty for fraud. In light of the rationales for the Commission's existence and
the scope of the relevant Congressional delegation, and in light of the
Commission's expertise in litigation matters and the contentious nature of
the underlying policy claims, the private securities litigation debate is
"precisely the sort of intricate, labor-intensive task for which delegation
to an expert body is appropriate."
Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action under the Federal Secu-
rities Laws: The Commission's Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 961, 966-67 (1994)
(quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 379 (1989)); see also SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 207, 209 (1947) (arguing that the SEC's judgments
deserve the most deference when they arise out of administrative experience, an un-
derstanding of legislative policy, and a fair treatment of the facts); Board of Trade
v. SEC, 923 F.2d 1270, 1273 (7th Cir. 1991) (explaining that the SEC is better
equipped than judges to interpret broadly worded statements that govern the securi-
ties industry).
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publicly-held companies. The thesis of this Article is that, in
light of the PSLRA, arbitration is the best means of resolving
these securities claims.
B. The Advantages and Disadvantages of Broadening the Role of
Securities Arbitration
The search for effective ADR mechanisms has intensified over
the last few decades.253 Concerns of cost, access, and conserva-
tion of judicial resources have spawned a re-evaluation of tradi-
tional court-based adjudication. 2 ' Some have even observed that
the litigation system, burdened by endless procedural and sub-
stantive legal technicalities and fundamentally adversarial in its
nature, is collapsing upon itself and taking law and justice with
it. 255
253. Indeed, the calls for reform of the prevailing dispute resolution system have
come from the highest echelons of the legal profession. See, e.g., Derek C. Bok, A
Flawed System of Law Practice and Training, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 570 (1983) (push-
ing for reform programs that simplify rules and procedures and provide greater ac-
cess to the legal system to the poor and middle class); Warren E. Burger, Agenda
for 2000 AD.-A Need for Systematic Anticipation, 70 F.R.D. 83, 93-96 (1976) (sug-
gesting alternatives to litigation); Warren E. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68
A-B.A. J. 274 (1982) (advocating assessment of alternatives to litigation).
254. See William Twining, Alternative to What? Theories of Litigation, Procedure
and Dispute Settlement in Anglo-American Jurisprudence: Some Neglected Classics, 56
MOD. L. REv. 380, 380 (1993) (stating that three primary concerns behind the drive
for ADR in the American legal system are: the perception of overburdened courts,
the need for specialized private fora, and issues of cost and access). The cost of liti-
gation is central to the PSLRA debate. Congress legislated on the assumption that
the "Big Six" accounting firms, major law firms, nationwide securities underwriters,
and the largest corporations in the country had inadequate resources to defend
themselves, and were "victimized" by plaintiffs who could impose large legal costs,
forcing them to settle otherwise frivolous claims. See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31
(1995). With respect to judicial resources, Chief Justice Burger stated: "[we are] on
our way to a society overrun by hordes of lawyers, hungry as locusts, and brigades
of judges in numbers never before contemplated." John Lang, Courting Disaster:
Some See Lawyers As Gross Domestic Product, ROcKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Sept. 8,
1998, at 1B, available in 1998 WL 7959617.
255. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 187, at 4. Carbonneau claims:
Legal adjudicatory institutions are paralyzed by the intricacies and so-
phistication of their own processes. The analytical rigor of legal reasoning
and the complex formalism of legal procedure are inadequate substitutes
for individual rationality, personal understanding, and mutual cooperation
in the quest to gain the civil resolution of conflictual circumstances.
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ADR has served as a primary means of dispute resolution
within the financial services industry. 6 In addition to broker-
customer arbitration in the securities industry, the futures in-
dustry maintains a parallel process for arbitration of customer
disputes arising from dealings with futures commission mer-
chants.257 The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
also maintains an administrative procedure for the resolution of
disputes involving industry professionals charged with violating
provisions of law administered by the CFTC.258
This Article proposes the implementation of a system of arbi-
tration modeled on the arbitration systems governing broker-
customer disputes. This kind of arbitration is characterized by:
the use of small panels of adjudicators with legal and nonlegal
expertise in the securities industry; informal procedural rules
providing for expedited discovery and adjudication; limited ap-
peal rights; elimination of juries; the restriction of extended mo-
tion practice; standardized discovery provisions; and minimal
technical requirements, such as particularity in pleading.259 Un-
der such a system of arbitration, the emphasis shifts from tech-
Antihumanistic both in its principle and in its practice, the adversarial
ethic works a subterfuge on society. It is deceitful not only as to its con-
cern for individual interests, but also in its regard for legality and the
integrity of substantive law.
Id.
256. See, e.g., Gammnaro v. Thorp Consumer Discount Co., 15 F.3d 93 (8th Cir.
1994) (using arbitration in the context of borrower-lender relationship); Myron v.
Hauser, 673 F.2d 994 (8th Cir. 1982) (employing ADR in commodities dispute). The
use of arbitration agreements in the financial services industry seems particularly
appropriate. First, this industry would benefit from the use of expert adjudicators
because of the complex nature of many financial transactions. Second, the quicker
these disputes are resolved, the quicker uncertainty is eliminated and financial re-
sources can be deployed for investment. Third, low cost adjudications are appealing
in this area because fewer resources are thereby diverted from financial markets.
Fourth, investors will respond to quick and fair remedies by demanding lower risk
premia on their investments. See supra note 7.
257. See, e.g., Geldermann, Inc. v. CFTC, 836 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1987).
258. The CFTC is charged with enforcement of the Commodity Exchange Act. See 7
U.S.C. § 15 (1994).
259. See supra note 16.
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nical legal analysis to doing that which is just.26 Arbitrators
may not ignore the law, but they are not bound by it either.
1. Potential Pitfalls of Wider Securities Arbitration
Much has been written about the desirability of ADR as an
alternative to traditional court-based adjudications.2 6 ' No clear
consensus has emerged, however, on a general theory of dispute
resolution. The empirical evidence from evaluations of when,
and to what extent, ADR can deliver on its promises is mixed.262
260. See University of Alaska v. Modem Constr., Inc., 522 P.2d 1132, 1140 (Alaska
1974) ("[Arbitrators need not follow otherwise applicable law when deciding issues
properly before them, unless they are commanded to do so by the terms of the arbi-
tration agreement."); see also Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
220, "259 (1987) ("[A]rbitrators are not bound by precedent . . . ."); Lentine v.
Fundaro, 278 N.E.2d 633, 635 (N.Y. 1972) ("Absent provision to the contrary in the
arbitration agreement, arbitrators are not bound by principles of substantive law ...
."). In fact, arbitrators rarely provide a written opinion in support of their awards.
See Lynn Katzler, Comment, Should Mandatory Written Opinions Be Required in All
Securities Arbitrations?: The Practical and Legal Implications to the Securities Indus-
try, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 151, 156 (1995) (noting that securities arbitrators usually
complete a standard award form and give little rationale for their decision). Obvious-
ly, the lack of a written opinion, combined with no mandate to follow legal princi-
ples, makes it exceedingly difficult to challenge an arbitration award under the
"manifest disregard of the law" standard of review. See supra note 233.
261. See, e.g., John P. Esser, Evaluations of Dispute Processing: We Do Not Know
What We Think and We Do Not Think What We Know, 66 DENY. U. L. REV. 499
(1989); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353
(1978); Laura Nader, Disputing Without the Force of Law, 88 YALE L.J. 998 (1979);
Frank E.A. Sander, Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution: An Overview, 37 U.
FLA. L. REV. 1 (1985); Susan Silbey & Austin Sarat, Dispute Processing in Law and
Legal Scholarship: From Institutional Critique to the Reconstruction of the Juridical
Subject, 66 DENY. U. L. REV. 437 (1989).
262. See Esser, supra note 261, at 542-43 (outlining the precepts of a "New For-
malism" regarding ADR and concluding that "the results of the research . . . in-
spired [by the assumptions of the New Formalism] have not substantiated the intel-
lectual coherence which these assumptions promise and predict"); Sander, supra note
261, at 15 ("Despite all of the recent developments in alternative modes of dispute
settlement, relatively little is known about the critical questions of [alternative dis-
pute resolution mechanisms]."). Discussions of the need for such a general theory of
dispute resolution mechanisms date as far back as the problems giving rise to the
search for alternatives to traditional litigation. See generally Panel Discussion, Let
the Tribunal Fit the Case-Establishing Criteria for Channeling Matters into Dispute
Resolution Mechanisms, 80 F.R.D. 166, 166 (1977) (discussing possible solutions for
the "pains of the rapidly growing volume of cases in our courts" that "breed delay,
require mass production methods, produce de-humanized 'processing' and badly strain
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This Article does not attempt to contribute to a general theory of
dispute resolution; it instead posits that expansion of securities
arbitration to all securities disputes involving publicly-traded
companies is a specific area of law in which the benefits of ADR
easily outweigh the detriments.2 3 This Article demonstrates that
the criticisms leveled at ADR generally do not apply with full
force to the kind of securities arbitration proposed herein.
One of the most persuasive criticisms of arbitration, and of
the Supreme Court's willingness to enforce almost all arbitration
agreements, is that it allows powerful interests to use superior
resources and bargaining power to impose unfair restrictions on
the legal rights of the weak.2e Critics have termed this short-
coming "disempowerment."265 Specifically, critics argue that ADR
is "no more likely to enhance... [the] delivery of justice in prac-
tice and that the net effect of the [ADRI movement would be to
discourage the disadvantaged from trying to assert their legal
rights."266 Indeed, the courts have been quite reluctant to void
arbitration agreements on grounds of unconscionability or un-
fairness.2 67 Instead, courts have allowed parties to impose unfair
the machinery of justice").
263. In this regard, this Article follows the path of others who have argued in fa-
vor of expanding ADR in specific areas. See Robert Coulson, Family Arbitration-An
Exercise in Sensitivity, 3 FAM. L.Q. 22, 22 (1969); Ronald L. Goldfarb & Linda R.
Singer, Redressing Prisoners' Grievances, 39 GEO. WASHL L. REV. 175, 314-16 (1970);
Timothy S. Hardy & R. Mason Cargill, Resolving Government Contract Disputes: Why
Not Arbitrate?, 34 FED. B.J. 1, 19-20 (1975); Paul Gerhardt George, Note, Arbitration
of Attorney Fee Disputes: New Direction for Professional Responsibility, 5 UCLA-ALAS-
KA L. REv. 309, 327-52 (1976).
264. See Sternlight, supra note 199, at 637 ("Large companies such as banks, hos-
pitals, brokerage houses and even pest exterminators are increasingly including man-
datory binding arbitration clauses in the fine print [ofi contracts they require all
customers, employees, franchisees and other little guys to sign.").
265. See AUERBACH, supra note 158, at 144-45. Professor Auerbach argues that
ADR ultimately is a tool for powerful interests to emasculate opposition. According
to Auerbach, ADR diffuses political organization, discourages the implementation of
litigation strategies, and debases the justice available to commoners. See id. at 144.
This certainly may be true in particular contexts, but in the securities context the
reader can decide whether any plaintiff faced with the gauntlet of federal court is
disempowered by relegation to a system of fair arbitration.
266. Twining, supra note 254, at 380-81.
267. See, e.g., Pierson v. Dean, Witter, Reynolds, Inc., 742 F.2d 334, 339 (7th Cir.
1984) (reversing district court holding that arbitration clause was unconscionable);
Northcom, Ltd. v. James, 694 So. 2d 1329, 1339 (Ala. 1997) (finding that there was
1110 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1055
conditions on remedies such as the ability to select arbitrators,
restrict the statute of limitations, and eliminate punitive damag-
es, all under the guise of arbitration agreements.268
This Article does not propose an unregulated arbitration re-
gime. Indeed, the Court has approved of securities arbitration
only because of the SEC's oversight. 69 This Article proposes a
highly regulated arbitration process in which the SEC and Con-
gress ultimately would determine how arbitrators are selected,
which procedures apply, which methods of discovery are avail-
able, and which remedies are authorized. The SEC and Congress
already have been successful in regulating securities industry
arbitration. v° The proposed arbitration system simply would
allow the SEC (with congressional oversight) to expand its su-
pervisory role and to apply arbitration procedures to a larger
universe of securities disputes. Given the SEC's reputation as a
tough but fair regulator 7' and an effective pro-investor advo-
no evidence of a lack of voluntariness and that the subsequent arbitration agreement
was not unconscionable).
268. See Sternlight, supra note 199, at 638. But see Teleserve Systems, Inc. v. MCI
Telecomm. Corp., 659 N.Y.S.2d 659, 664 (App. Div. 1997) (holding $204,000 arbitra-
tion filing fee to be unconscionable on its face). Professor Sternlight has raised seri-
ous concerns regarding the due process implications of unregulated arbitration. See
Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's Preference
for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and
Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 40-100 (1997).
269. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 225-38 (1987).
As Carbonneau has stated:
According to the McMahon interpretation of Wilko and Scherk, statutory
language providing for the nonwaiver of judicial remedies will be effective
only when arbitration, the alternative, is deemed to be an inadequate
remedial process for adjudicating statutory rights. Expressed more forth-
rightly, the syllogistic logic yields the following new rule of law: express
statutory language attributing exclusive jurisdiction to the courts will de-
feat a private agreement to arbitrate only when the courts determine
that arbitration is an inadequate remedy to protect the statutory rights
in question. The Court's review of the relevant precedent amounts to a
reconstruction of the prior law.
CARBONNEAU, supra note 187, at 131.
270. See supra note 218. For example, in response to legislative pressure, the SROs
enacted Section 31 of the Uniform Code of Arbitration. See Katsoris, SICA, supra
note 17, at 520. Section 31 regulates the use of predispute arbitration agreements
mandating that such provisions be clearly disclosed to customers. See id. Congress
also was responsible for the GAO's study of the fairness of arbitration. See id. at
488 n.27.
271. See Katharine Barrett & Richard Greene, The Big Vision Meets the Real
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cate,272 as well as its track record in regulating industry arbitra-
tion procedures, 73 there simply is no reason to suspect that the
evils of unregulated arbitration would infect wider securities ar-
bitration under the auspices of the SEC.2 ' The proposed expan-
sion of securities arbitration also must be tested against the cur-
rently existing system (i.e., the system under the PSLRA), which
has undergone a severe restriction of investor remedies, instead
of against a historical ideal securities adjudication system.
Viewed in that light, arbitration hardly disempowers investors,
who currently have few rights under federal law. 275 If the SEC
can provide a fair forum, investors will benefit greatly from arbi-
tration because it would provide a quick, nonappealable remedy.
Consequently, the proposed arbitration would empower, not
disempower, consumers of securities.
Delegalization is another criticism that persistently has been
leveled against ADR.276 The idea of delegalization raises two con-
cerns: first, that movement to ADR retards the ability of the law
to evolve creatively to meet new problems or to craft new solu-
tions on behalf of society,27 ' and second, that the movement of
disputes from the courts to ADR has the effect of denying legal
rights because arbitrators are not bound by law.2 78 Although the
World, FIN. WORLD, Oct. 26, 1993, at 32.
272. See Douglas J. Darsch, The National Securities Market Improvement Act: How
Improved is the Securities Market?, DUQ. L. REV., Winter 1998, at 365, 367-68 (stat-
ing that the SEC is described accurately as the investor's advocate).
273. See supra note 23.
274. See supra note 206.
275. See generally Branson, supra note 58 (discussing the pro-defendant Burger and
Rehnquist courts).
276. See, e.g., Michael D.A. Freeman, Questioning the Delegalization Movement in
Family Law: Do We Really Want a Family Court?, in THE RESOLUTION OF FAMILY
CONFLICT: COMPARATIVE LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 7, 14-20 (Jenn M. Eekelaar & Sanford
N. katz eds., 1984); Austin Sarat, Informalism, Delegalization, and the Future of the
American Legal Profession, 35 STAN. L. REv. 1217 (1983) (reviewing THE POLITICS OF
INFORMAL JUSTICE (Richard L. Abel ed., 1982)). This also has been a concern of com-
mentators in the securities arbitration area. See generally David A. Lipton, Generat-
ing Precedent in Securities Industry Arbitration, 19 SEC. REG. L.J. 26 (1991) (ques-
tioning whether the subterranean development of law in the securities industry is
appropriate).
277. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085-87 (1984) (ar-
guing that promotion of early or alternative dispute resolution robs society of the
benefits of judicial law making); Twining, supra note 254, at 381.
278. This is a concern that was present in the Supreme Court's debate on the pro-
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Court no longer views the second point as valid,2 79 it is sound in
theory. Specifically, it is true that because arbitrators are not
bound by law they may deny relief in circumstances in which le-
gal remedies otherwise may exist. It is just as true, however,
that there may be circumstances in which the law denies reme-
dies and arbitration extends them. Arbitrators are charged to do
what is just and fair; this is, after all, the end game of law. If
arbitrators ignore law to achieve justice, has the purpose of law
been frustrated? This Article takes the position that choosing
justice over formalistic law is the superior result.2 0
With respect to the first concern identified above, securities
arbitration supervised by the SEC need not lead to any atro-
phied area of law.281' First, the expansion of arbitration advocat-
ed in this Article would have no impact on the development of
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws in the
criminal context, in the context of SEC enforcement actions, or
in securities disputes not involving public companies.28 2 In many
ways, the criminal and enforcement context is the context in
which the SEC's regulatory influence is most prominent.2' For
priety of arbitration in the context of broker-customer disputes in McMahon. Justice
Blackmun, in dissent, pointed to the lenient requirements for the preparation of a
record, the continued disinterest in announcing reasons for arbitral decisions, and
the substantially limited judicial review of arbitration rulings as the reasons against
compelling arbitration of 10b-5 claims in which plaintiffs had signed predispute arbi-
tration agreements. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,
258-59 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
279. See Rodriguez de Quijos v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,
480-81 (1989).
280. See MACNEIL, supra note 197, at vii, 171-80 (lamenting "Bureaucratic Formal-
ism" and pathological adjudicatory patterns in court-based litigation); see also
CARBONNEAU, supra note 187, at 237-41 (summarizing reasons why litigation fails to
deliver on truth-finding promises and urging a more creative dispute resolution
mechanism).
281. See Lipton, supra note 276, at 36.
282. See supra notes 29-31.
283. One commentator has discussed the threat that arbitration can pose to effec-
tive regulatory schemes, such as securities or antitrust laws:
Arbitrators cannot be expected to sacrifice the most equitable resolution
of the dispute between the parties in favor of the economic needs of soci-
ety as expressed in the antitrust laws. This is not because arbitrators
are any less capable or unbiased than judges or because they have fewer
resources at their disposal, but because the task of arbitration is incon-
sistent with the purposes and functions of the antitrust laws. Arbitrators
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example, a criminal action recently enabled the SEC to expand
liability for insider trading to persons who are not classic "insid-
ers."2S The antifraud provisions could continue to develop in
these contexts and be applied to SEC-sponsored arbitration pro-
ceedings. Second, all other areas of law that could be subject to
the proposed arbitration jurisdiction would continue to develop
in state proceedings not involving publicly held companies.285
Again, these developments could be applied to SEC arbitration
proceedings. Third, the antifraud provisions are committed to
the discretion of the SEC.28 The SEC therefore is in a position
to redefine the antifraud provisions administratively in response
to new frauds.28 7 Similarly, if the SEC sees fit to modify existing
obligations in light of new circumstances, there is no sound rea-
son why it should not be able to do so.288 Finally, the SEC could
require written opinions, and publish those of widespread impor-
tance or those addressing novel issues.289
are entrusted with the responsibility of working justice between the par-
ties as it appears to them and without explaining their conclusions. Anti-
trust laws, by contrast, have little to do with justice between the parties.
Thus, there is a choice to be made. Either arbitrators should be permit-
ted to resolve disputes that implicate antitrust issues as they do other
disputes-unbound by rules of law and at the possible sacrifice of anti-
trust policies-or they mus4 be prohibited entirely from arbitrating such
disputes. There is no middle ground consistent with the arbitration pro-
cess as it has developed in this country.
Stewart E. Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate: An Examination of the
Public Policy Defense, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 481, 503-04 (1981).
284. See United States v. O'Hagdn, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2214-19 (1997).
285. The proposed arbitration regime is senseless unless the SEC arbitration forum
can take entire disputes, including state and federal claims. Otherwise, these dis-
putes would be splintered among adjudicatory forums. Thus, this Article proceeds on
the premise that any state law claims would be adjudicated under the SEC's arbi-
tration regime.
286. See Grundfest, supra note 252, at 966.
287. See id. at 966-67.
288. This raises an interesting question. If the SEC is responsible for the publica-
tion of important opinions or interpretative releases, is this superior to the chaotic
and arbitrary method by which opinions are now selected for publication? For exam-
ple, how many cases that may have spawned innovative judicial opinions have set-
tled? See Twining, supra note 254, at 382 (stating that only a "tiny" fraction of all
cases lead to an appellate opinion).
289. The downside to requiring written opinions is that it invariably facilitates an
appeal. See ROBERT COULSON, BusINEss ARBITRATIONS--WHAT You NEED TO KNOW
30 (4th ed. 1991) ("Written opinions . . . identify targets for the losing party to
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Commentators also have contended that ADR mechanisms
may tend to gravitate toward the very system they replace.290
For example, the system of arbitration used to resolve securities
disputes between customers and brokers has developed in a di-
rection that resembles traditional litigation.29' It appears, how-
ever, that much depends on the rules and administration of the
particular forum. Ultimately, the securities arbitration system
has maintained its flexibility, fairness, and efficiency because it
has been subject to detailed oversight.292 There is no reason why
the SEC would not be able to preside over a system of securities
arbitration with similar success.
The study of the strengths and weaknesses of ADR is still an
evolving process. Nevertheless, after several decades of increas-
ing use of ADR, far more advanced data exists on its successes
and failures.29 Essentially, this data shows that specific ADR
mechanisms can work if properly implemented and monitored.294
This Article proposes that the SEC implement a closely moni-
attack."). The SROs have left to the arbitrators the decision of whether a written
opinion should support an award. See HOBLIN, supra note 16, at 12-16. Allowing the
SEC to decide whether awards should be supported by written opinion and pub-
lished would recognize the agency's unique authority to define securities fraud under
Rule 10b-5. See Grundfest, supra note 252, at 966 n.9.
290. See Twining, supra note 254, at 391 (stating that benefits of ADR cannot ever
be taken for granted); Todd B. Carver & Albert A. Vondra, Alternative Dispute Res-
olution: Why it Doesn't Work and Why it Does, HARV. BUS. REV., May-June 1994, at
120 ("The bad news is that ADR as currently practiced too often mutates into a pri-
vate judicial system that looks and costs like the litigation it's supposed to pre-
vent.").
291. See ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 21, at 7 ("The increasingly
litigious nature of securities arbitration has gradually eroded the advantages of SRO
arbitration.").
292. See generally Perry E. Wallace, Jr., Securities Arbitration After McMahon, Ro-
driguez and the New Rule: Can Investor's Rights Really Be Protected?, 43 VAND. L.
REV. 1190 (1990) (discussing the SEC role in the development of securities arbitra-
tion).
293. See Esser, supra note 261, at 500.
294. In a recent assessment of arbitration, Professor Sternlight demonstrated that
arbitration is not universally speedier, cheaper, and fairer than conventual litigation.
See Sternlight, supra note 199, at 701-02. Instead, she concluded that arbitration
"can be superior" in certain circumstances, such as when the parties to arbitration
have equal bargaining powers. See id. at 702. This Article posits that in circum-
stances in which parties, ex ante, have radically unequal positions (e.g., investors
under the PSLRA) regulated arbitration can replace the balance.
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tored and tightly regulated arbitration system. All of the data
available regarding ADR tends to support the viability of this
concept, especially in the analogous broker-customer context.95
Thus, it appears that implementing an arbitration system for
claims involving publicly-traded companies is sound. Certainly,
there are potential procedural pitfalls in imposing an arbitration
regime in this context, but these are hardly insurmountable.
For example, the SROs that sponsor customer-broker arbitra-
tion have chosen not to exercise arbitration power over class-
action disputes, and the SEC has concurred in this judgment. 96
This does not mean that class action securities disputes cannot
be resolved in arbitration.29 Class adjudications and arbitration
are not inherently inconsistent. In fact, many courts have or-
dered class-wide arbitration. 29' The "class arbitration" ordered by
295. See supra notes 234, 250, 256.
296. See Katsoris, SICA, supra note 17, at 492 (citing UNIF. CODE OF ARBITRATiON
§ 21(d)). According to Professor Katsoris, the prohibition of class action arbitration
was added only "[aifter much debate and discussion." Constantine N. Katsoris,
Should McMahon be Revisited?, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 1113, 1122 (1993); see also Order
Approving Rule Excluding Class Actions from Arbitration, Exchange Act Release No.
34-31371, 52 SEC Docket 2189, 2189-90 (Oct. 28, 1992). The assessment of the SEC
and NASD that class claims should be excluded from arbitration does not turn on
any determination that any such disposition cannot be ordered in arbitration in ac-
cordance with due process, or that arbitrators could not handle such issues as class
certification. See id. Instead, the SEC and NASD were concerned with the possibility
of duplicative and wasteful proceedings, apparently resulting from some groups of
plaintiffs being bound to arbitrate while others were free to litigate. See id. These
objections can be overcome by achieving universal agreements to arbitrate within
agreements with the entire class of plaintiffs-if, for example, the agreement to arbi-
trate was within all subscription agreements for stock in an initial public offering.
297. See FLETCHER, supra note 17, at 292-95 ("Clearly, arbitration of class actions
is possible, but the potential pitfalls are many."). In Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465
U.S. 1 (1984), the Supreme Court declined to rule on the issue of whether class-wide
arbitrations are inconsistent with the Federal Arbitration Act when the arbitration
agreement does not provide for class disposition of claims. See id. at 17. Thus, the
California Supreme Court's order requiring class-wide arbitration, see Keating v. Su-
perior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1209 (Cal. 1982), rev'd sub norm. Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), was not reversed.
298. See Izzy v. Mesquite Country Club, 231 Cal. Rptr. 315, 322 (1986); Lewis v.
Prudential Bache Secs., Inc., 225 Cal. Rptr. 69, 76 (1986); Boynton v. Carswell, 233
S.E.2d 185 (Ga. 1977); Stevenson v. Commonwealth, 413 A.2d 667, 669 (Pa. 1980).
But see Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 276-77 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding
that class arbitration is not permitted in the absence of an authorizing provision in
arbitration agreement); Gammaro v. Thorp Consumer Discount Co., 828 F. Supp.
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a court that is most analogous to the proposed arbitration is in
the context of shareholder derivative claims.299 If fundamental
notions of due process are observed, arbitration rules can pro-
vide for class-wide adjudication of claims.00 As long as class ac-
tion parties have notice that their claims are being adjudicated,
their rights can be determined despite their absence.30 1 This is a
very important issue because securities claims generally, and
those involving public companies in particular, are uniquely ap-
propriate for class-wide adjudication.3 2 Moreover, much of the
673, 674 (D. Minn. 1993) (same).
299. See In re Salomon Inc. Shareholders' Derivative Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 98,454 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 1994) (ordering arbitration of shareholder de-
rivative claims pursuant to stock exchange membership of corporation); see also G.
Richard Shell, Arbitration and Corporate Governance, 67 N.C. L. REV. 517, 558-60
(1989) (noting courts' efforts to manage class-wide arbitration); Jeffery A. Sanborn,
Note, The Rise of "Shareholder Derivative Arbitration" in Public Corporations: In Re
Salomon Inc. Shareholders' Derivative Litigation, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 337,
341-42 (1996) (analyzing the holding of Salomon, and proposing the adoption of
shareholder derivative arbitration).
300. Due process rights in the class action context center around notice re-
quirements and adequacy of representation. See, e.g., In re Four Seasons Sec. Laws
Litig., 502 F.2d 834, 842 (10th Cir. 1974); 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 103, § 1786
(2d ed. 1986); see also FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIViL PROCEDURE §§ 10.20-10.24
(4th ed. 1992) (discussing due process considerations of class adjudication, including
adequacy of representation, notice of pendency of action, opportunity to opt out, and
judicial scrutiny of settlements). In Eisen u. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156
(1974), the Court held that "[i]ndividual notice must be sent to all class members
whose names and addresses may be ascertained through reasonable effort." See id.
at 173. The Court further asserted that notice to "class members is not a discretion-
ary consideration to be waived." Id. at 176.
301. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-15
(1950).
302. See 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 103, § 1781, at 4 ("With apparent increas-
ing frequency, Rule 23(b)(3) is being utilized in . . . securities fraud suits."). In ad-
dition:
Rule 10b-5 cases typically satisfy all of the prerequisites for a class
action enumerated in Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
First, the plaintiffs tend to be so numerous that it would be impractical
for a court to hear each of their claims individually. Second, the class
members usually share identical questions of law or fact. Third, the al-
leged claims or defenses of the class representatives often typify the
claims and defenses of the other class members. Fourth, the representa-
tives usually are able to provide adequate representation to absent class
members.
Upon satisfying these prerequisites, the class then must fall under
one of the 23(b) categories in order to be certified. Courts often employ
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efficiency to be gained from arbitration would be lost without
class-wide adjudication. A company would, in fact, face the
nightmare of seriatim adjudication. It is crucially important,
therefore, that the efficiency advantages of class-wide adjudica-
tion be utilized in arbitration of securities claims involving pub-
licly held companies. °  Judicial authority indicates that lan-
guage in the arbitration agreement can address many of the is-
sues relating to class arbitration."'
Numerous avenues are available to assure that, in claims
against publicly-held companies, notice to class members is pro-
vided in accordance with due process."0 5 Shareholders of public-
ly-held companies already are the recipients of numerous corpo-
rate communications, such as proxy statements, annual reports,
and filings with the SEC."0 6 This same communication machin-
ery could be used to require shareholder notification of pending
class action arbitrations. °7
Rule 23(b)(3) in securities litigation because subdivision (b)(3) "encompass-
es those cases in which a class action would achieve economies of time,
effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons
similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing
about other undesirable results."
WaItcher, supra note 210, at 392 (footnotes omitted) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23 ad-
visory committee's notes, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102-03 (1966)).
303. See Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 785 (3d Cir. 1985); FED. R. CIrv. P.
23, advisory committee's notes, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102-03; 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note
103, § 1781, at 51.
304. See Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 274-75 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating
that a provision in an arbitration agreement may authorize class-wide arbitration);
see also First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) (holding
that the parties to an arbitration agreement may provide that the arbitrators can
determine whether given issue is arbitrable); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman
Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 64 (1995) (holding that the parties to arbitration may de-
termine the law applicable to a dispute, including the availability of punitive dam-
ages). Given the broad power the arbitration agreement holds over the contours of
the arbitration procedure, that agreement surely would be enforced, in accordance
with its terms, regarding the availability and process of class-wide arbitrations. See
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
305. See, e.g., In re Warner Communications Sees. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 746
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
306. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-1, 240.13a-11, 240.13a-13, 240.14a-3 (1998) (stat-
ing periodic reporting requirements to shareholders); see also Warner Communica-
tions, 618 F. Supp. at 746 (concluding that notice sent to brokers, banks, and other
nominees for mailing to class members, combined with publication in financial publi-
cations, complied with due process requirements).
307. For example, notice could be attached to the information that issuers of secu-
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A final potential pitfall to the proposal of this Article is cost.
Arbitration, like any dispute resolution system, is costly. The
NASD relies on filing fees and cost assessments to defray about
seventy percent of the costs of the securities arbitration forum
that it operates. 8 Given the cost savings to parties of arbitra-
tion over litigation, SEC-regulated arbitration could have a simi-
lar fee structure. A realistic assessment of the costs must look at
net costs. Money saved from court administrative costs could be
used to offset costs of arbitration at the SEC. Overall, moving
cases from court dockets to the SEC arbitration docket will cost
much less due to restricted motion practice, appeals, and discov-
ery disputes.
2. Advantages of Wider Securities Arbitration
Certain types of disputes are more amenable to arbitration
than others,"0 9 and securities disputes appear to be ideally suited
to arbitration. First, this is an area where expert adjudicators
have the ability to extend a higher quality of justice because of
the complexity and specialized nature of these disputes. Courts
have recognized the shortcomings of juries in the context of so-
phisticated business litigation. One court even held that in cer-
tain cases due process could be denied if a case is of sufficient
complexity as to be beyond the ken of a typical jury.310 Securities
litigation often may qualify as such a case. It often demands
knowledge of sophisticated business techniques and financial
analysis, as well as how such factors may affect a company's
securities. Highly qualified experts with advanced business de-
grees may be called upon to testify. Depending upon the busi-
ness involved, a case may require expertise in biotechnology,
computer engineering, or the oil industry. Arbitration seeks to
rities send to security holders pursuant to 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1998).
308. See supra note 21.
309. See supra note 256.
310. See In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1086-87 (3d
Cir. 1980) (holding that the due process clause prohibits juries from hearing excep-
tionally complex cases). Many of these "shortcomings" flow from the fact that these
disputes, if tried, consume weeks of trial time. This, too, imposes strains upon the
ability to dispense justice. See id.
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substitute expert fact finders for lay fact finders. This may not
only enhance the quality of justice available but also lower the
cost of adjudications. 1 ' Using experts in this way does not in
any way call into question the abilities of jurors. In fact, special-
ized arbitrators also may be preferable to judges. An arbitrator
who is an accountant is likely to know what motivates accoun-
tants better than a judge without an accounting background. 2
In any event, comparisons between juries and arbitrators are
misplaced. Under the PSLRA, juries only rarely hear securities
claims. Arbitration of these disputes thus is more democratic
than the current dispute resolution regime.
Second, this is an area that can limit litigation costs by re-
quiring standardized discovery. Transactions involving the secu-
rities of publicly-traded companies produce predictable sources
of documentary evidence. 13 For example, investment bankers
and other professionals usually are involved in material transac-
tions and compile extensive "due diligence" files containing the
findings of their investigations.3 14 Similarly, attorneys and ac-
countants maintain detailed files containing relevant,
nonprivileged information.1 5 These documents can be produced
311. See Kenneth R. Davis, When Ignorance of the Law is No Excuse: Judicial Re-
view of Arbitration Awards, 45 BUFF. L. REv. 49, 132 (1997); Ann C. Hodges, The
Steelworkers Trilogy in the Public Sector, 66 CHI-KENT L. REV. 631, 678 (1990).
312. See generally DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990)
(holding as a matter of law that an accountant would not engage in fraud in ex-
change for fees).
313. Publicly traded companies are required to submit reports to the SEC and their
shareholders. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-1, 240.13a-11, 240.13a-13, 240.14a-3 (1998).
314. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1994) (providing a cause of action to any purchaser of
securities for misrepresentations in a registration statement filed with respect to the
securities under the Securities Act). This liability applies to issuers and those who
sign registration statements, as well as experts, like underwriters, accountants, or
other professionals, who allow their statements to be used in the registration state-
ment. A person, other than an issuer, escapes liability by showing "after reasonable
investigation" that there was no ground for believing that the registration statement
was materially misleading. See id. § 77k(b)(3). Thus, this liability creates an incen-
tive for professionals, directors of an issuer, and senior officers to undertake a "due
diligence" investigation of the offering. See Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 283 F.
Supp. 643, 682-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (applying section 77k to underwriters, accountants,
officers, and directors).
315. See Apex Mun. Fund v. N-Group Sec., 841 F. Supp. 1423, 1430-32 (S.D. Tex.
1993) (discussing "due diligence" and waiver of privilege).
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at the outset of every securities dispute, thereby greatly reduc-
ing discovery squabbles, lowering expenses, and increasing effi-
ciency.3
16
Third, speedy adjudications would provide unique benefits to
the parties to these kinds of disputes.1 7 Business risks and un-
certainties would remain unresolved for less time. For compa-
nies that have engaged in no wrongdoing, quick adjudication
and lower defense costs eliminate pressure to settle otherwise
meritless claims.318 If a defendant is faced with a weak claim
that can be economically and quickly resolved, the leverage of an
"extortionate" settlement evaporates.1 9 Granting arbitrators the
express power to sanction parties for pursuing frivolous claims
or maintaining frivolous positions can strengthen this aspect of
arbitration.320 As an additional tool to deter frivolous litigation,
courts have recognized that arbitrators retain discretion to
award attorneys' fees to prevailing parties.32 1 Even in the ab-
sence of a provision within the agreement commanding arbitra-
tion or a rule of the arbitration forum, courts have upheld
awards of attorneys' fees. 22 In short, arbitration can eradicate
the ills that formed the basis for enacting the PSLRA.
3 23
In this respect, the experience of securities arbitration in the
broker-customer dispute arena is instructive. For example, dur-
ing 1994, the NASD was able to achieve an average resolution
time of 10.4 months for securities disputes referred to it.
324
Arbitration of securities claims costs only one-third of the cost of
316. See ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 21, at 82-86.
317. See supra note 17.
318. See supra note 254.
319. See Miller, supra note 18.
320. See id. at 17-19; Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63
IND. L.J. 425, 483 (1987-1988).
321. See, e.g., Marshall & Co. v. Duke, 114 F.3d 188, 189 (11th Cir. 1997) (uphold-
ing an award of $634,107 in attorneys' fees in favor of brokerage firm), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 1043 (1998).
322. See Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1064 (9th Cir.
1991) (holding that arbitrators may sanction "bad faith" conduct); First Interregional
Equity Corp. v. Haughton, 842 F. Supp. 105, 112-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (same). But see
McDaniel v. Berhalter, 405 So. 2d 1027, 1029 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (holding
that absent statute or specific agreement, arbitrators may not award attorneys' fees).
323. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
324. See Masucci, supra note 17, at 188-89.
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adjudication of securities claims.325 In addition, NASD arbitra-
tors in these disputes have imposed sanctions in appropriate
circumstances, even absent explicit authority in the rule govern-
ing industry arbitration. 26
On the other hand, requiring the arbitration of disputes
should not close the doors of justice to meritorious claims. In
fact, because awards must be paid thirty days after decisions,
investors with meritorious claims receive compensation swift-
ly.32' Even though arbitrations in the broker-customer context
are sponsored by industry-controlled SROs, each study of the
fairness of arbitration has concluded that there is no evidence of
systematic unfairness to investors. 21 Similarly, although plain-
tiffs originally were suspicious of industry-sponsored arbitration,
many prominent plaintiffs' counsel now have embraced arbitra-
tion.3 29 The SROs that sponsor arbitration in the securities in-
dustry have strived to maintain the perception of impartiality
and fairness. Over the years, they appear to have achieved just
that.33
0
If the SEC were responsible for overseeing the arbitration of
investor claims involving publicly-traded companies, it would
325. See supra note 19.
326. See infra note 328.
327. "It is axiomatic that justice delayed is justice denied"; therefore, investors in
arbitration achieve a high quality of justice, at least to the extent that, all other
things being equal, they receive quicker compensation. Miller, supra note 18, at 1.
328. One study stated:
First, we conclude, along with the vast majority of those who presented
their views to us, that, even with its flaws, securities arbitration is clear-
ly preferable to civil litigation. Arbitration offers investors a more effi-
cient, faster, and cheaper process than court litigation.
Second, although many investor representatives claim that SRO sponsored
securities arbitration is unfair, neither the independent studies conducted,
nor the statistics on the results of customer-broker arbitrations, support
this conclusion. In 1992, for example, the GAO concluded, after an exten-
sive survey, that arbitration results at SRO sponsored forums "show no
indication of a pro-industry bias." Between 1991 and 1995, arbitrators
awarded damages to customer claimants in 50 percent of all cases they
decided. These results are not consistent with a systemic bias in favor of
industry parties.
ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 21, at 18 (footnotes omitted).
329. See supra note 216.
330. See supra note 22.
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begin with some key advantages. The SEC is widely perceived to
be a tough, fair, and efficient industry watchdog.331 The SEC has
established itself generally as a pro-investor agency over the
years. 32 The SEC already has a long history in supervising arbi-
tration in a balanced fashion.31 With this reputation, any SEC-
operated arbitration forum would start out as presumptively
fair. The SEC also has a specific mandate from Congress to use
its expertise to stem fraud in the securities markets: Rule 10b-
5.31 If the SEC concluded that the best policy to pursue in such
efforts is arbitration, it is not likely that any court would inter-
fere with that exercise of discretion. 35
In all, arbitration can provide a means for a fair and efficient
resolution of private securities claims involving publicly-held
companies. Speed and low cost can eliminate frivolous claims.
The SEC, because of its reputation, expertise, administrative
powers, and experience, is uniquely qualified to administer and
regulate this system of dispute resolution.
331. See Barrett & Greene, supra note 271, at 32, 49 ("The [SEC] defies all stereo-
types. Members of the securities industry, academics, even attorneys who are suing
the SEC speak about it in glowing terms."). Barrett & Greene analyzed eight gov-
ernment agencies that regulate business. The average grade was a C; the SEC was
rated the highest with an A-. See id. at 33, 49. Even the critics of federal securities
regulation have recognized that the Commission has achieved a degree of stature as
a fair and effective regulator. See Stigler, supra note 35, at 117 ("It is doubtful
whether any other type of public regulation of economic activity has been so widely
admired as the regulation of the securities markets by the Securities and Exchange
Commission.").
332. Recently, Chairman Levitt stated: "The Commission remains dedicated to the
protection of investors, efficient capital formation, enhanced disclosure, and the dili-
gent oversight of the securities markets." SEC REPORT, supra note 12, at 64.
333. See supra note 23.
334. See supra note 32.
335. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2217-18 (1997) (stating that
where the SEC has prescribed legislative rules, courts must accord such rules "con-
trolling weight" unless it has acted "manifestly contrary to the statute." (quoting
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984))).
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C. The Authority for, and Legality of, Expanded Securities
Arbitration
The arbitration of disputes generally results from an agree-
ment of the parties to waive their right to a court adjudication
and limit their remedies to those available in arbitration. This
Article proposes that Congress or the SEC take steps to impose
agreements to arbitrate securities disputes and that the SEC
provide a securities arbitration forum for securities disputes in-
volving publicly-held companies. This section focuses on two key
questions: whether there are significant limits on congressional
power to impose such agreements in this context, and whether
Congress has granted power to the SEC to provide such an arbi-
tration forum and to encourage such agreements. For the pro-
posed arbitration scheme to achieve its goals effectively, it must
take jurisdiction over entire disputes, not just claims under the
federal securities laws. In other words, the arbitration forum
must have jurisdiction over all claims and persons arising from
shareholder claims in which a publicly-held company (and/or
affiliated individuals or professionals) failed to provide informa-
tion properly in connection with investment decisions. In the
parlance of federal civil procedure, the arbitration forum must
be endowed with "supplemental jurisdiction."336 Without this
authority, fragmented parallel litigation could offset any cost
savings.
1. Limitations on Congressional Power
The question of congressional power to impose arbitration re-
ally requires two inquiries. The first involves assessing the lim-
its on congressional power to deny a party an Article III court
proceeding and the right to a trial by jury for federal statutory
claims. Private remedies under the federal securities laws exist
in tandem with a detailed regulatory scheme. 3 7 Courts have
336. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994) (defining the circumstances in which federal
courts have jurisdiction over state claims even though diversity jurisdiction require-
ments are not met).
337. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 593-94 (1985)
("Congress, acting for a valid legislative purpose pursuant to its constitutional pow-
ers under Article I, may create a seemingly 'private' right that is so closely integrat-
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long held that these types of claims do not require a trial by jury
and that Congress has the power to entrust their enforcement to
administrative adjudication.33 In addition, Congress has the
power to deny access to the public securities markets to those
who fail to consent to arbitration of disputes. 39 Courts have
upheld congressional power limiting access to certain business
activities to those who consent to arbitrate disputes.34° These
principles give Congress full authority to impose arbitration
agreements, as a matter of legislative requirement, between
investors and public companies.
The second inquiry is whether Congress can create an arbitra-
tion forum to resolve entire disputes, including those involving
state common-law claims. This implicates Article III of the Con-
stitution, which requires that the judicial power of the United
States be vested in courts staffed by judges with life tenure and
undiminishable compensation. 41 Whether the current proposal
offends Article III is not free from doubt; consent is not disposi-
tive of the issue. 42 The Supreme Court has held, however, in
Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 4 that Con-
gress may provide for alternative dispute resolution without of-
fending Article III if the parties consent to the use of the forum,
and the forum has narrowly tailored powers and jurisdiction
ed into a public regulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency resolu-
tion with limited involvement by the Article III judiciary.").
338. See Myron v. Hauser, 673 F.2d 994, 1003 (8th Cir. 1982) (citing Atlas Roof-
ing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 460 (1977)).
339. See generally Liest v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1980) (upholding the
power of CFTC to restrict access to the futures market).
340. See Geldermann, Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comn'n, 836 F.2d 310,
317 (7th Cir. 1987); see also Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478
U.S. 833, 848 (1986) ("[A]s a personal right, Article III's guarantee of an impartial
and independent federal judication is subject to waiver.. . ."). Arbitration is based
upon at least nominal consent; therefore, it is the best means for securing the cre-
ation of a specialized adjudicatory forum for disposing of securities disputes.
341. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
342. See Geldermann, 836 F.2d at 321 ("Article In, § 1 not only preserves to liti-
gants their interest in an impartial and independent federal adjudication of claims
within the judicial power of the United States, but also serves as 'an inseparable
element of the constitutional system of checks and balances.'" (quoting Northern
Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58 (1982)).
343. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
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aimed at a congressional purpose that creates a necessity for the
alternative forum."44
At issue in Schor was the CFTC's reparations jurisdiction.
Section 14 of the Commodity Exchange Act provides that any
person injured by a commodity broker's violation of the Act or of
CFTC regulations may apply to the CFTC for an order to pay
reparations, which the complainant may then enforce in federal
district court.3 The CFTC promulgated a rule that allowed it to
adjudicate counterclaims arising out of the same transactions or
occurrences as those set forth in the reparations complaint.3
Schor challenged the CFTC's authority to exercise such jurisdic-
tion on Article III grounds.3' 7 The Court stated that there are no
bright line tests for determining when Congress impermissibly
authorizes the adjudication of Article III business in a non-Arti-
cle III forum.3" Instead, the Court focused on several factors.
First, the Court examined the allocation of power between the
CFTC and Article III courts over such disputes and concluded
that the essential attributes of judicial power were not ceded
because the CFTC required the courts to enforce its awards, its
awards were subject to nondeferential judicial review, and the
CFTC did not exercise all the ordinary powers of federal district
courts.349 Second, the Court gave weight to the fact that the
CFTC's jurisdiction was limited to a particular area of the law
instead of being endowed with broad general civil jurisdiction. '0
Third, the Court looked at the nature of rights subject to the
CFTC's jurisdiction and concluded that although those rights
344. See id. at 851-52 (holding that CFTC's exercise of alternative dispute resolu-
tion jurisdiction over commodities-related state counterclaims did not violate Article
III of the Constitution).
345. See 7 U.S.C. § 18 (1994).
346. The regulation challenged in Schor was 17 O.F.R. § 12.23(b)(2) (1983).
347. Schor also challenged the CFTC's jurisdiction on federalism grounds because
the CFTC purported to exercise jurisdiction over state claims. See Schor, 478 U.S.
at 857-58. The Court concluded that there was no basis for challenging an agency's
exercise of adjudicatory power over state claims because the Court had long recog-
nized the federal governments ancillary jurisdiction over state counterclaims assert-
ed in federal court. See id. at 858.
348. See id. at 851.
349. See id. at 852-53.
350. See id. at 852.
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were traditionally enforceable in courts, the CFTC was exercis-
ing its jurisdiction only as a "narrow... incident" of its primary
jurisdiction. 5' Fourth, the Court viewed Congress's purpose as
being the creation of an inexpensive and expeditious dispute
resolution mechanism, not a reallocation of power from federal
tribunals.352 Finally, the Court noted that the CFTC had "obvi-
ous expertise" and was administering a reparations scheme of
"unquestioned constitutional validity," in which supplemental
jurisdiction was needed to ensure the effectiveness the con-
gressional alternative dispute resolution scheme. 3 It is fair to
say, then, that in the context of financial institution regulation,
the Supreme Court already has held that the creation of an
alternative forum with specialized expertise, for the expeditious
resolution of entire disputes, and with limited powers in a par-
ticularized area of law, is not contrary to Article III.
2. Limitations on SEC Power
The SEC already has sufficient administrative power to imple-
ment broad arbitration initiatives that could go a long way to-
ward ultimately achieving the arbitration of all securities claims
involving publicly-held companies." The first step in this pro-
cess is the creation of an arbitration forum. Initially, the SEC
could provide a forum for the submission of such claims to arbi-
tration. Congress appears to have authorized expenditures made
in connection with such a forum. 55 The mere existence of such a
forum is likely to attract the voluntary submission of pending
and prospective cases.
Another source of the SEC's discretion to encourage arbitra-
tion is the SEC's power to accelerate the effectiveness of regis-
tration statements under the Securities Act.3 56 For example, the
351. See id. at 854.
352. See id. at 855.
353. Id. at 855-56.
354. See generally Pearce v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 828 F.2d 826, 829 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (noting that the SEC has "expansive power to ensure the adequacy of . . .
arbitration procedures'" (quoting Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482
U.S. 220, 233 (1987))).
355. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78d, 78d-1 (1994).
356. See id. § 77h (allowing the SEC to accelerate the effectiveness of a securities
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SEC historically has refused to accelerate the effectiveness of
registration statements when the issuer has an indemnification
agreement that is inconsistent with SEC policy on indemnifica-
tion. 57 Nothing would prevent the SEC from using that authori-
ty to require new registrants to insert arbitration provisions into
relevant agreements with the purchasers of the securities, there-
by requiring the arbitration of any securities dispute before the
SEC. In other words, investors would agree to arbitrate based on
arbitration agreements with issuers; issuers and related parties
would agree to arbitrate based on those same agreements
through the coercion of the SEC. The SEC has broad discretion
to promulgate regulations "as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions" of the Securities Act. 58 Many registrants view accel-
eration as important to the distribution of the securities. Over
time, such a regulation could have the effect of committing many
securities claims to SEC arbitration.3 9
registration statement if in the "public interest").
357. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.512(h), 230.461(c) (1998). See generally I LOSS &
SELIGMAN, supra note 7, at 550-58 (discussing both the history of the SEC's use of
its power to accelerate and objections that the SEC may use this power only to
further the goal of disclosure).
358. 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (1994).
359. Professors Cary and Eisenberg have concisely summarized the importance of
acceleration:
Section 8 of the 1933 Act provides that "Except as hereinafter provided,
the effective date of a registration statement shall be the twentieth day
after the filing thereof or such earlier date as the Commission may de-
termine. .. ." Present SEC practice calls for the staff to thoroughly re-
view registration statements that fall into certain categories, such as
first-time registration statements on Form S-1. Almost invariably such a
review will turn up matters the staff considers to be problems. Although
the SEC has the power to issue a "stop order" suspending the effective-
ness of a registration statement, that is considered a rather drastic reme-
dy, and is seldom invoked. Instead, the staff will typically send a letter
of comment, or deficiency letter, pointing out the problems the staff finds
with the registration statement as filed. The process of comment, re-
sponse, and revision may result in delay long past the original twenty
days. Moreover, the twenty-day period begins running every time an
amendment to the registration statement is filed. This creates a potential
Cateh-22. The registration statement must include the price of the securi-
ties. For a variety of reasons, the price usually cannot be set until the
last minute. But setting the price is an amendment, which causes the
twenty days to start running again. To get around the Catch, it has be-
come accepted industry practice to request from the SEC, an acceleration
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The SEC also holds sway over issuers who do not request ac-
celeration. The SEC has relied on an informal process of dia-
logue with issuers in reviewing registration statements.3 60 The
SEC could suggest the use of arbitration provisions during these
conversations; many issuers likely would follow this suggestion.
Over time, an increasing percentage of securities disputes would
be subject to arbitration.
Another mechanism the SEC can use to encourage arbitration
of securities claims is section 10(b) itself. 61 This broad grant of
administrative power essentially allows the SEC to define rights
and obligations arising under section 10(b) so long as it does not
stray beyond the text of the statute. 62 Given the breadth of au-
thority granted to executive agencies under Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 31 the SEC has gen-
erous latitude to promulgate rules to effectuate the purposes of
section 16(b).3 4 Commentators generally have recognized that
this gives the SEC sufficient power even to "disimply" private
remedies under Rule 10b-. 365 If the SEC "has the power to
disimply private rights of action" under Rule 10b-5, certainly the
SEC could commit the resolution of such claims to a reasonable
forum, such as arbitration. The SEC thus appears to have the
power to require arbitration of claims under this section.3 66
of the effective date of the registration statement, so that it will become
effective immediately after the pricing. Although acceleration requests are
routinely granted, the SEC has often used its power to grant or withhold
acceleration as a vehicle to make registrants comply with various SEC
policies. In addition, the fear of nonacceleration may lead a registrant to
be responsive even to those comments in a deficiency letter with which it
disagrees.
WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORA-
TIONS 1491-92 (7th ed. 1995).
360. See HAZEN, supra note 44, at 135-41.
361. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 106, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
362. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2214-18 (1997) (upholding SEC
authority to promulgate 17 C.F.R. § 240.14(e)(3) (1996)) (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
363. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
364. Section 10(b) is inoperative without Commission "rules or regulations." See 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b).
365. Grundfest, supra note 252, at 975; Seligman, supra note 2, at 438.
366. By requiring the arbitration of Rule 10b-5 claims, the SEC would be forcing
investors either to bring the entire dispute to arbitration or to forego the Rule 10b-5
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The SEC could impose the broadest arbitration of securities
disputes pursuant to its authority over national securities ex-
changes and the NASD.36 The SEC has very broad power over
the rules of these entities.368 Each exchange and the NASD,
however, imposes its own requirements upon issuers listed on
their trading facilities.369 Congress has empowered the SEC to
assure that the rules of SROs "prevent fraudulent and manipu-
lative acts and practices," "promote just and equitable principles
of trade," and "protect investors and the public interest."7 0 The
SEC could require SROs to force listees to enter arbitration
agreements as a condition of being listed with the SRO.3 7 1 SROs
traditionally have imposed substantive requirements upon listed
companies .3  These rules certainly seem more substantively
claim. Thus, investors who pursue Rule 10b-5 claims would be agreeing to arbitrate.
Presumably, public companies (and affiliated parties) would be willing to submit to
arbitration in exchange for a requirement that such companies' investors could only
bring Rule 10b-5 claims in arbitration. Alternatively, Rule 10b-5 could be amended
to provide that companies executing arbitration submission agreements are subject to
Rule l0b-5 claims only in arbitration.
367. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f, 78o-3.
368. See id. § 78s; supra note 206 and accompanying text.
369. See Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (reviewing
limits on the SEC's regulatory powers over exchange listing requirements). The
Rules of the NYSE, for example, served as the basis for compelling the arbitration
of a shareholders' derivative suit, including allegations of securities fraud under the
federal securities laws. See In re Salomon Inc. Shareholders' Derivative Litig., Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,454 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 1994). This case is really a fluke. It
just so happened that Salomon Inc. was affiliated with a broker-dealer that had
agreed to arbitrate disputes arising from its business that involved its employees.
The defendants in the case were three Salomon Inc. employees. Very few publicly
held companies are broker-dealers, and thereby subject to the arbitration rules of an
SRO. Nevertheless, the case is significant because it demonstrates that these kinds
of cases are amenable to arbitration.
As one commentator stated: "After over seventy-five years of commercial arbitra-
tion in the United States, In re Salomon Inc. Shareholders' Derivative Litigation has
broken the judiciarys monopoly over the resolution of public shareholder disputes by
opening the door to 'shareholder derivative arbitration' in public corporations."
Sanborn, supra note 299, at 337 (footnotes omitted).
370. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(b)(5), 78o-3(b)(6).
371. The SEC has both the power to approve SRO rules and direct SROs to adopt
certain rules. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (giving the SEC broad power over the rules of
any national securities exchange desiring to be registered with the SEC); id. §
78s(c) (giving the SEC power to "abrogate, add to or delete from" the rules of SRO
"in furtherance of the purposes" of the Exchange Act).
372. See IV Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 7, at 1826-54.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1055
intrusive on the rights of securities issuers than merely defining
the process of dispute resolution. By utilizing this power, howev-
er, the SEC runs the risk of proceeding in a nongradual fashion.
Moreover, the SEC would risk a court's holding that it had over-
stepped its bounds; one court already has imposed significant
limitations on this particular SEC power. 7'
As previously discussed, any arbitration regime that failed to
ensure that entire disputes are arbitrated in a unified proceed-
ing would fail to achieve the proposal's cost-cutting and adjudi-
cation-accelerating objectives. If significant numbers of dispu-
tants are beyond the reach of SEC arbitration mandates, paral-
lel court adjudications could undermine the arbitration system.
This means that the SEC must insist not just that issuers and
investors agree to arbitrate, but also that all professionals (in-
cluding accountants, attorneys, underwriters, directors, and offi-
cers) agree to arbitrate. This raises the following question: under
any means of obtaining agreements to arbitrate from issuers, is
it appropriate for the SEC to insist that affiliated professionals
agree to arbitrate? The SEC already exercises sufficient jurisdic-
tion over most professionals (including directors and officers)
involved in the securities activities of publicly-held companies,
and would not exceed its authority by requiring such profession-
als to arbitrate securities disputes.
For example, Rule 102(e) of the SEC's Rules of Practice allows
the SEC to bar attorneys and accountants from practice before it
if they are unqualified to represent persons before the SEC,
violate ethical standards, or violate the federal securities laws.7 4
The SEC's authority to regulate professional conduct in this
manner springs from section 23(a)(1) of the Exchange Act, which
provides that the SEC may make "such rules and regulations as
may be necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions of
this [Act] ."' The courts have upheld the SEC's authority to reg-
373. See Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 415 (invalidating an SEC rule banning
stock exchanges from listing companies that restrict per-share voting rights because
the rule interfered with the allocation of substantive powers, which is a matter for
state law).
374. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (1998) (formerly 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)).
375. 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(1).
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ulate accountants and attorneys under Rule 102(e), pursuant to
this authority.37 6 Rule 102(e) is not without its critics, howev-
er. 37 There are clear limits to how far the SEC may go in regu-
lating professional conduct.3 78 Still, courts have ruled that reg-
ulations such as Rule 102(e) must be sustainable when they are
a "necessary adjunct.., to protect the integrity of... adminis-
trative procedures and the public in general."37 9 The SEC there-
fore appears to have sufficient power to enact narrowly-crafted
rules, indirectly encouraging (or even requiring) listed compa-
nies to secure arbitration agreements from affiliated parties, in-
cluding attorneys and accountants. The SEC could defend this
rule by arguing that extension of its clear power over SROs (and
thus listed companies) or its power to accelerate is necessary to
preserve the integrity of its administratively-supervised arbitra-
tion forum and to protect the investing public.38 This method of
assuring that entire disputes are arbitrated seems no more in-
trusive than Rule 102(e), and as an exercise of legislative au-
thority cannot be deemed arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to
law.
Unlike the CFTC's reparations jurisdiction, SEC-sponsored
arbitration would benefit from additional considerations that
support its constitutionality. Arbitration is consensual, even
the somewhat "mandatory" arbitration this Article proposes. 8 '
376. See Sheldon v. SEC, 45 F.3d 1515, 1518 (11th Cir. 1995) (rejecting an argu-
ment that using SEC Rule 102(e) to discipline attorneys is improper); Davy v. SEC,
792 F.2d 1418, 1421-22 (9th Cir. 1986) (addressing the criticism that Rule 102(e)
should not apply to attorneys or accountants and stating that "[n]o court has adopt-
ed the view espoused in this literature"); Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570,
579 (2d Cir. 1979) (stating that "the Rule is not inconsistent with the Commission's
statutory authority").
377. See Ralph C. Ferrara, Administrative Disciplinary Proceedings Under Rule 2(e),
36 BUS. LAw. 1807 (1981); see also Judah Best, In Opposition to Rule 2(e) Proceed-
ings, 36 BUS. LAW. 1815 (1981) (asserting that the SEC is not competent to judge
lawyer conduct); Robert A. Downing & Richard L. Miller, Jr., The Distortion and
Misuse of Rule 2(e), 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 774 (1979) (arguing that Rule 2(c) has
been misused to regulate accounting profession).
378. Certainly the SEC could not require an agreement to arbitrate disputes as a
specific condition of admission to practice before it. See 5 U.S.C. § 500.
379. Touche Ross, 609 F.2d at 582.
380. See United States v. OHagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2217-18 (1997).
381. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 855 (1986)
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Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that requiring an agree-
ment to arbitrate as a condition of engaging in a certain busi-
ness is sufficient consent for purposes of Article 111.382 Thus, a
commodities broker or a securities broker may be required to
"agree" to arbitrate customer disputes as a condition of doing
business.38 3 Moreover courts have recognized the strong federal
policy in favor of arbitration.3"4 Therefore, there is a strong legal
basis to support SEC or congressionally-mandated arbitration of
securities disputes involving publicly-held companies.
The SEC does not really have the power to impose an alterna-
tive dispute resolution regime without the support of Congress.
The SEC may promulgate a regulatory initiative without specific
legislative authority, but if Congress is opposed to the initiative,
it may preclude the SEC's exercise of its rulemaking powers.385
As a practical matter, then, any SEC action in this area would
be undertaken only with congressional approval. 86 Second,
(noting that "the decision to invoke this forum is left entirely to the parties and
the power of the federal judiciary to take jurisdiction of these matters is
unaffected").
382. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985) (holding
that legal requirement that manufacturers submit certain disputes to binding arbi-
tration in order to conduct certain business does not obviate the consensual nature
of arbitration).
383. See Geldermann, Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 836 F.2d 310,
318 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that economic compulsion has no impact on the question
of whether a broker has consented to arbitrate); Patten Secs. Corp. v. Diamond
Greyhound & Genetics, Inc., 819 F.2d 400, 406 (3d Cir. 1987) (finding that a stock-
broker can be compelled to arbitrate by virtue of membership in SRO). Of course, as
previously noted, all stockbroker-dealers must associate with an SRO and all SROs
require members to arbitrate disputes at the request of customers. See supra note
218 and accompanying text. Thus, in order to be a broker-dealer, one must "consent"
to arbitrate.
384. See Geldermann, 836 F.2d at 322 ("The fact that the non-Article III forum
challenged is arbitration is also of importance. Recently in a case arising in
the ... securities industry, the Supreme Court reaffrmed that the Federal
Arbitration Act... establishes a 'federal policy favoring arbitration." (quoting
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987)); see also
Pearce v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 828 F.2d 826, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating that
the federal policy favoring arbitration "is at its strongest where the arbitration will
be governed by procedures specifically tailored to the context from which the agree-
ment to arbitrate arises, and will be conducted by arbitrators who are expert in
the . . . relevant industry").
385. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226 ("Like any statutory directive, the Arbitration
Act's mandate may be overridden by a contrary congressional command.").
386. This is particularly so in light of the intense congressional scrutiny over the
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courts and commentators have recognized the enormous power
of the SEC over implied private actions arising out of the federal
securities laws.3"' Combined with the broad delegation of powers
to the SEC,8 ' it would seem reasonable that the courts defer to
the SEC and turn back challenges to its power to encourage the
arbitration of such claims. Thus, if the SEC sponsored an arbi-
tration forum for securities disputes involving publicly-held com-
panies and used its discretion to encourage its use, it seems un-
likely that courts would hold this to be beyond the SEC's author-
ity. Companies that insert arbitration provisions in relevant
corporate documents, with or without SEC compulsion, are cer-
tain to oblige securities holders to arbitrate disputes. Indeed,
courts have bound consumers to far flimsier agreements to arbi-
trate. 89
The broadest power to require agreements to arbitrate, how-
ever, rests with Congress. Attempts by the SEC to impose wider
arbitration could create confusion and uncertainty, and lead to
more, not less, wasteful litigation. The SEC therefore would be
best served by first implementing a more narrow form of arbi-
tration, such as a purely voluntary forum. The creation of such a
forum would be an important first step in demonstrating to Con-
gress the viability and efficacy of arbitration in the context of
securities disputes. After this step, the SEC could informally
request that new publicly-held companies include arbitration
provisions in their subscription agreements, and the SEC could
even promulgate model provisions. Next, the SEC could condi-
tion acceleration upon the inclusion of arbitration provisions.
These preliminary steps would contribute to congressional anal-
ysis of the desirability of broader arbitration. As previously dis-
cussed, much about the relative advantages of arbitration is un-
known. Any experience that the SEC can accumulate about the
arbitration of these disputes could only assist legislative initia-
private securities litigation system. See Avery, supra note 2, at 347-53.
387. See supra note 252.
388. See supra note 368 and accompanying text.
389. See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148-50 (7th Cir. 1997)
(enforcing an agreement to arbitrate placed in a computer box and delivered to a
computer purchaser).
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tives in this area. This Article calls for exploratory steps, as op-
posed to a leap. The imposition of full arbitration of securities
disputes should be based on experience. It is noteworthy, howev-
er, that this process will not deter any publicly-held company
from requiring arbitration of securities disputes before the SEC
as a means of protecting itself from "strike suits." This provides
immediate relief from frivolous litigation.
D. Some Suggestions on Implementation
The proposed arbitration regime is not a simple solution. It is
precisely because of this complexity that this Article argues in
favor of gradually implementing this ADR regime. Beyond the
utility of gradualism, some of the problems and issues discussed
in this Article suggest that any arbitration regime pursued in
the securities law context should include several important fea-
tures. Specifically, in order to exploit fully the advantages of
arbitration and minimize the negative consequences, any arbi-
tration regime should include several basic elements.
First, the SEC must ensure the involvement of all key constit-
uencies in all phases of this ADR system. 9° This includes public
investors, institutional investors, plaintiff and defense counsel,
representatives of publicly-held companies, affiliated profession-
als, and members of the securities industry. Any SEC rules
establishing an arbitration forum, requiring arbitration provi-
sions in agreements between public investors and companies, or
setting the guidelines of the arbitration forum, would, as a mat-
ter of administrative procedure, extend to all these parties the
opportunity to comment. The SEC must do more, however. Only
with the involvement of all these actors can a system of ADR in
390. The NASD has been quite careful to include all important constituencies in its
Task Force on Securities Arbitration. See ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE, supra
note 21, at 1 ("The Task Force is composed of eight persons who have various back-
grounds in the area of securities arbitration."). Indeed, the Task Force included two
former SEC Commissioners, general academics, industry executives, defense attor-
neys, a plaintiffs' attorney, and individuals who had served as mediators or arbitra-
tors. See id. at app. 1-1 to 1-11. SICA took the same approach. SICA was created
under the auspices of the SEC to structure arbitration rules in a fair and uniform
manner. SICA draws its members from the securities brokerage industry, academia,
and representatives of the public. See Katsoris, SICA, supra note 17, at 488-89 n.28.
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this area achieve a widespread perception of fairness."' Thus,
any body charged with promulgating or supervising this arbitra-
tion system should be comprised of all these constituencies.
Similarly, the pool of arbitrators must be drawn from these
groups. Arbitrators also must be reasonably compensated, select-
ed on a competitive basis, and required to undertake periodic
training. The SRO arbitration fora provide an excellent model in
this respect, by imposing training requirements and undertaking
new recruitment and compensation initiatives. 92 Additionally,
arbitration panels must not be dominated by industry-affiliated
individuals. Again, the SROs have dealt effectively with this
issue by generally requiring panels to have at least three public
arbitrators.Y Qualified and impartial arbitrators are the key to
assuring that the public accepts, and has confidence in, any sys-
tem of mandatory arbitration. 94
Second, like the SROs, the SEC should provide specific mech-
anisms for the ongoing evaluation and improvement of the arbi-
tration process it supervises. The Arbitration Task Force, the
SEC's creation of SICA, and other studies of the fairness and
efficiency of arbitration at the SROs undoubtedly have con-
tributed to the generally favorable perception of arbitration
among the public. 95 One reason why the SRO arbitration pro-
cess has been so successful and has achieved public acceptance
is that the SROs have monitored and improved their arbitration
procedures. These procedures have been modified based on the
comments of the public, experts in the area, and industry repre-
sentatives. 96
391. See generally Katsoris, SICA, supra note 17 (discussing SRO arbitration rules).
392. See ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 21, at 102-13 (specifying the
training regimen for arbitrators, recommending specialized training of arbitration
panel chairs, recommending that additional recruitment efforts be undertaken, and
recommending that compensation be raised).
393. See Katsoris, SICA, supra note 17, at 546 (reprinting UNIFORM CODE OF ARBI-
TRATION § 8(a)(1)).
394. See generally ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 21, at 107-12 (of-
fering suggestions for better trained arbitrators as a response to concerns regarding
arbitrator quality).
395. See supra text accompanying note 214.
396. See Katsoris, SICA, supra note 17, at 537.
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Third, because of the nature of the disputes subject to the ar-
bitration proposal of this Article-complex disputes, often involv-
ing class action issues-the rules governing this arbitration pro-
cedure must be able to reach rapid adjudication even with com-
plex subject matter. SRO arbitration is of limited utility in this
context because SRO arbitration rules do not provide for class
action resolutions. While this goal may present challenges, they
are not insurmountable. For example, the SROs are currently
considering requiring Early Neutral Evaluation (ENE).397 Al-
though the empirical evidence with respect to ENE is sparse, it
seems particularly helpful in cases with complex discovery phas-
es."9 8 The primary goal of ENE is to facilitate settlement by
397. See ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 21, at 51. The Task Force
commented:
Early neutral evaluation (ENE), while less well known than mediation, is
an equally valuable approach to early dispute resolution. Unlike media-
tion, its primary purpose is not to settle the dispute, but rather to ap-
prise the parties of the strength of their cases. Nevertheless, settlement
is often a beneficial outcome of ENE. In ENE, a skilled evaluator with
considerable experience in the subject matter of the dispute reviews the
parties' initial submissions and key documents. In some circumstances,
the ENE also asks the parties for a brief written submission that sum-
marizes the main issues in the dispute. The parties then confer with the
evaluator, either in person or by conference call, and each side presents
a very abbreviated version of its case. This presentation is similar to an
offer of proof at the beginning of a trial. Occasionally, the parties may
offer abbreviated testimony from witnesses or experts. During and after
the presentations, the evaluator may ask questions of the parties, seek
stipulations on agreed issues, clarify the remaining issues in dispute, or
discuss discovery issues. At the end of the presentations, the parties may
choose to enter into direct settlement negotiations, often facilitated by the
evaluator.
Barring settlement discussions, however, the evaluator then delivers a
brief and candid assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of each
side's case. Typically, the evaluator provides a brief written summary of
this assessment, which might include an attempt to predict likely case
outcomes. As noted, unlike a mediator, the evaluator is not necessarily
trying to direct the parties toward a possible settlement. Rather, the pur-
pose is to offer a candid appraisal of the case. Often, this "reality check"
compels each side to undertake a more dispassionate and realistic assess-
ment of its case. In light of this experience, parties may approach settle-
ment discussions or arbitration within a more constructive and well in-
formed framework.
Id.
398. See Joshua D. Rosenberg & H. Jay Folberg, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An
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exposing each side of a dispute to a "reality check."3 99 Secondary
goals include facilitating discovery, focusing parties on key is-
sues, obtaining stipulations, and finding efficient ways to dis-
pose of disputes. 00
Fourth, any process for arbitrating securities claims involving
publicly-held companies must be quick and inexpensive in order
to achieve the goal of deterring frivolous lawsuits. Several ideas
may prove successful in this context. For example, the use of
neutral experts can slash costs.40 1 Although the Federal Rules of
Evidence include a provision authorizing the use of court-ap-
pointed experts,40 2 this provision has been used infrequently. Of
course, this is of no concern in arbitration, in which there is no
jury and the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply.40 3 Arbitra-
tors should be given authority to appoint neutral experts in ap-
propriate circumstances. Depositions should be avoided because
they are quite costly, and often serve only to delay proceed-
ings. °4 In 1993, the federal courts specifically limited the avail-
ability of depositions in federal court because of cost and delay
concerns.40 5 Another means of controlling litigation costs (and
streamlining proceedings) is an early prehearing conference
Empirical Analysis, 46 STAN. L. ?. 1487, 1511 (1994).
399. The North American Securities Administrators Association, comprised of 50
state securities agencies, already has endorsed ENE as a method of dealing with
securities class actions. See Securities Litigation Reform Proposals, supra note 68, at
209.
400. See JAY E. GRENIG, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION WITH FORMS § 30 (2d
ed. 1997).
401. See, e.g., Carver & Vondra, supra note 290, at 128 (stating that the use of a
neutral expert can create pressure upon parties to negotiate).
402. See FED. R. EvID. 706.
403. Indeed, even in the context of jury-tried issues, the Supreme Court has recent-
ly encouraged the use of court-appointed experts. See General Elec. Co.v. Joiner,
118 S. Ct. 512, 521 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing FED. R. EvID. 706).
404. The current Uniform Code of Arbitration commands parties to use informal
information exchanges to the maximum extent possible. The Arbitration Policy Task
Force has proposed restricting depositions even further in securities industry arbitra-
tion. See ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 21, at 85 ("The Task Force
also recommends that the rules permit depositions in standard arbitration only in
exigent situations.").
405. See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(2) advisory committee's notes. Rule 30 was amended
in 1993 with the specific objective of addressing the costliness of civil litigation. See
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between parties and at least one arbitrator through whom an ex-
change of information can be facilitated, issues narrowed, and
the need for briefs discussed.40 6 Arbitrators should be given
broad authority to identify issues within a dispute, order the
production of key documents or information, request briefs, and
make scheduling orders designed to resolve disputes quickly and
fairly.47 There should be provisions for standardized, mandatory
exchange of documents, shortly after pleadings are completed, in
order to minimize discovery costs and delays.40 8
Fifth, there must be a system for achieving class-wide adjudi-
cations, at least for issues that are most appropriate for class
disposal. 40 9 The very nature of securities disputes involving pub-
licly-held companies mandates this treatment because share-
holders often have interests in issues of common facts or law.
This means the rules governing such arbitrations must provide a
mechanism for class certification similar to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23.410 Unfortunately, this is one area in which there is
little experience upon which to draw, but the concept appears
sound, so long as due process requirements are met.41' One
406. See ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 21, at 127 (noting the im-
portance of streamlining and issue narrowing to success of the ADR).
407. This suggestion also is consistent with the recommendations of the Arbitration
Policy Task Force. See id. at 86 (recommending that the chair of the arbitration
panel be given a greater role in the prehearing process).
408. The Arbitration Task Force suggested this very method for expediting and
streamlining discovery in the context of securities industry arbitration. See id. at 82
("Unlike civil litigation generally, securities arbitration claims routinely present re-
curring issues that require the same types of evidence.").
409. It should be noted that because there is some authority that, absent a specific
agreement, arbitrations may not be consolidated, the SEC must include class action
provisions in any agreements to arbitrate securities disputes involving public compa-
nies. See, e.g., Weyerhauser Co. v. Western Seas Shipping Co., 743 F.2d 635 (9th
Cir. 1984).
410. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23. The certification process is extensive and its primary
purpose is to protect absentee class members from entry of binding judgment when
their interests have not been adequately represented. See, e.g., In re Mid-Atlantic
Toyota Antitrust Litig., 564 F. Supp. 1379 (D. Md. 1983) (approving temporary set-
tlement class); Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 80 F.R.D. 32, 50 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (holding
that any alleged antagonisms between interests of two groups, certified for settle-
ment as a class, were outweighed by unities of interest).
411. Commentators differ on the degree of court involvement in class arbitration.
Compare FLETCHER, supra note 17, at 292-95 (noting that "courts are instructed to
ensure adequate procedural safeguards to protect the rights of class members"), with
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method for accommodating these concerns could be to empower
administrative law judges to handle class certification issues
and other class problems. Arbitration provisions within agree-
ments must address these concerns so that all members of the
class agree to be bound by class-wide adjudications.
Sixth, the procedures for arbitrating these disputes must pro-
vide for enforcement referrals to the SEC in appropriate cases.
This recognizes that a major purpose of private rights is to sup-
plement the SEC's enforcement efforts." SRO arbitration fo-
rums have addressed this issue and concluded that arbitration
awards should be routinely forwarded to enforcement authori-
ties.413 The fact that arbitration has traditionally enjoyed a high
degree of privacy raises confidentiality concerns.414 Given the
basis of private enforcement, however, arbitrators must have the
power to refer completed cases to enforcement personnel.
Finally, any system of SEC-sponsored arbitration should ad-
dress another problem inherent in securities litigation involving
publicly-held companies. Specifically, courts frequently have ap-
proved settlement agreements in which shareholders pay the
settlement costs. 415 When a company is forced to pay sharehold-
ers claiming to be victims of fraud, all shareholders bear the
costs. 416 This result cannot sharpen the deterrence value of the
Waltcher, supra note 210, at 400-04 (advocating a moderate level of judicial over-
sight). See also Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration and the Multiparty Dispute: The
Search for Workable Solutions, 72 IOWA L. REV. 473, 491 (1987) (discussing types of
disputes submitted to ADR and reasons given for doing so).
412. See generally HOBLIN, supra note 16, at 2-6 (commenting on the regularity
with which disputes resulted not only in a filing for arbitration, but also are re-
ferred to an SRO committee for disciplinary action).
413. See id. at XVII-1.
414. One of the objectives of SICA has been to provide educational materials to
arbitrators to assist them in discharging their duties. See id. at XVI-22. One such
item is the Arbitrators Manual. Included in this manual is the American Bar Associ-
ation's and American Arbitration Association's Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Com-
mercial Disputes. See id. at XXXII-21.. Canon VI of this code mandates confidentiali-
ty of all proceedings and decisions. See id. at XXXII-28.
415. This is a problem that Chairman Levitt acknowledged in his Congressional
testimony, when he pointed out that the SEC's primary constituents-investors-are
usually present on both sides of securities fraud litigation involving public corpora-
tions. See Securities Litigation Reform: Hearings, supra note 71, at 34 (testimony of
Arthur Levitt, SEC Chairman).
416. See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
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federal securities laws and does not serve the policies underlying
those laws. The SEC therefore must give arbitrators significant
authority to probe settlements for substantial fairness and to ap-
prove only settlements in which wrongdoers bear the costs.
Before any detailed rules can be promulgated for such an arbi-
tration regime, much must be settled. The point is that this sys-
tem of dispute resolution is workable, and can be designed spe-
cifically to facilitate the fair and efficient resolution of securities
claims.
CONCLUSION
This Article proposes that Congress or the SEC implement a
regime of broad arbitration of private securities disputes involv-
ing publicly-held companies. The Article posits that arbitration
will sound the death knell of "strike suits" and extortionate set-
tlements because such arbitration should specifically emphasize
the quick and inexpensive resolution of these claims. Further,
arbitration may utilize a pool of expert adjudicators, with securi-
ties expertise, as a means of expediting disputes and increasing
the quality of justice available. The prospect of quick, low cost
adjudications would hardly chill meritorious claims. Consequent-
ly, this Article urges the adoption of broader securities arbitra-
tion as the best means of dealing with both meritorious and friv-
olous claims.
Moreover, the Article demonstrates that broader arbitration,
properly implemented under the auspices of the SEC, reduces
the risks inherent in deregulating or defederalizing the capital
markets and thereby eroding investor confidence. Either Con-
gress or the SEC could implement such a regime consistent with
the Constitution and, in the case of the SEC, its administrative
powers. Finally, the Article illustrates that most of the perceived
problems with broader arbitration in the securities area may be
addressed and resolved through the promulgation of specific
rules to govern such arbitrations.
This Article is an effort to find an alternative to the polarized
debate currently surrounding private securities litigation. It rec-
ognizes the value of deterring frivolous litigation in a balanced
1140
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manner. Most of all, this Article is a search for some means of
avoiding the problems inherent in leaving investors victimized
by unfair markets with no real remedy.
